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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Kitchen, Danielle Ashley. M.A. Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 
2012. Whens Laws and Representation are Not Enough: Enduring Impunity and Post-
Conflict Sexual Violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
 
 
Throughout the course of history, literature and examination on the impact of civil war 
has focused little on women, especially in the cases of wartime rape. While the factors 
which sustain wartime rape are examined with frequency, using gender as an analytical 
lens, the analysis regarding post-conflict sexual violence and rape is studied far less, 
leading to the question: what factors are correlated with the continuance of widespread 
acts of rape even after the cessation of official conflict? Liberia and Sierra Leone suffered 
high levels of both wartime rape and also post-conflict sexual violence. This comparative 
case study, using process tracing and the congruence method tests the hypothesis that 
governments in which there are high levels of female representation will be associated 
with lower levels of impunity for sexual assault and this will result in lower levels of 
sexual violence. This study finds that the presence of a female head of state in Liberia 
does not simply equate to lower levels of sexual violence. The existence of a female 
president does not necessarily reflect (or translate into) changed gender relations. The 
passing of laws and the implementation of these laws, such as those in Sierra Leone, will 
affect women’s lives more positively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: wartime rape, post-conflict sexual violence, domestic violence, civil war, 
gender, impunity, female representation, Liberia, Sierra Leone
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1998, the Rome Statute (establishing the International Criminal Court [ICC]) 
expanded international law to include rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual assault as a crime against humanity.1 Prior to the 
Rome Statute, international war crimes mostly included murder, torture, etc. and did not 
specifically focus on gendered war crimes. Because wartime rape has been experienced 
in many, if not most, conflicts around the world, it is oftentimes regarded as a 
“byproduct” of war, and because of this, little legal action has been taken historically. 
Throughout this study, it is important to understand that rape as a weapon of war is not 
specific to any particular society or country; it has occurred globally throughout time. For 
example, prior to 1998, “Neither the 1945–46 International Military Tribunals in 
Nuremberg nor the 1946–48 International Military Tribunals for the Far East explicitly 
enumerated war crimes involving rape, despite evidence that rape and other sexually 
violent crimes were systematically used during World War II.”2  
 In addition to rape and sexual violence during war, post-conflict sexual violence 
and rape is mostly unexplained, leading to the question: what factors are correlated with 
the continuation of widespread acts of wartime rape even after the cessation of formal 
conflict, specifically in the cases Sierra Leone and Liberia? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 United States Senate Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, “Rape as a Weapon of War: 
Accountability for Sexual Violence in Conflict,” (United States Senate Subcommittee on Human Rights 
and the Law Hearing, Washington, D.C., 2008), 79. 
2 Ashley Dallman, “Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the International Criminal Court,” 
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (2009): 2-3. 
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 Today, unfortunately, sexual violence and rape during wartime continues to be 
under-prosecuted and systematic, where high levels of wartime sexual violence continue 
to be reported and observed in various places around the world… even after the perceived 
cessation of violence and peace initiatives are in place. As UN Women agency states, 
“With regard to trials of sexual violence as a war crime, crime against humanity, crime 
associated with genocide, and use in torture, sexual violence has been the ‘least 
condemned war crime.’”3 
 More recently, however, it has been theorized by scholars as well as the UN that 
women’s participation in the political process, including the rising numbers of women in 
parliament, has increased the response to women’s policy concerns, as well as in 
establishing governmental and institutional legitimacy.4 As Daniel Stockemer states, 
“…Women have pushed for female-friendly policies in education, health care and equal 
rights in diverse countries including South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda… [Where] the 
share of parliamentary seats held by women in Africa has increased substantially from 
around 7 per cent in 1990 to around 18 per cent in December 2008.”5  
 This study will seek to determine whether governments in which there are high 
levels of female representation have made a significant difference for women in terms of 
levels of gender violence within the country. Given the expectation regarding female 
politicians, this study hypothesizes that governments with high levels of female 
representation will be associated with lower levels of impunity for sexual assault and this 
will result in lower levels of sexual violence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 UN Women, “Facts & Figures on Peace & Security,” 
http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/facts_figures.php#5. 
4 Daniel Stockemer, “Women’s Parliamentary Representation in Africa: The Impact of Democracy and 
Corruption on the Number of Female Deputies in National Parliaments,” Political Studies (2011): 694. 
5 Ibid, 693. 
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 Today, more and more initiatives are being passed in regards to wartime sexual 
violence. It was not until 50 years later that the United Nations (UN) adopted Resolution 
1820 (in 2008), which primarily focuses on ending rape and sexual violence as a weapon 
of war by armed groups during conflict. During those 50 years, however, the efforts of 
ad-hoc tribunals and special courts, helped bring some perpetrators to justice, specifically 
in cases of war and genocide. The creation of these courts show that various 
“masterminds” of war crimes are no longer going unpunished, according to the Global 
Policy Forum, with Daniele Archibugi stating “As preventive instruments, they might 
hopefully deter genocides in other parts of the world…”6 
 Since the 1998 Rome Statute, and because of ad-hoc tribunals and special courts, 
and Resolution 1820, the idea of wartime sexual violence being an inescapable outcome 
of war is slowly being abandoned.7 However, as stated by the agency UN Women, 
formerly UNIFEM, “Out of 300 peace agreements for 45 conflict situations in the 20 
years since the end of the Cold War, 18 have addressed sexual violence in 10 conflict 
situations (Burundi, Aceh, DRC, Nuba Mountains, Sudan/Darfur, Philippines, Nepal, 
Uganda, Guatemala, and Chiapas).”8 
 Liberia and Sierra Leone are two of the places where post-conflict gender-based 
violence and impunity for gender-based violence exists. Both countries are signatories to 
the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), which seeks to eliminate gender-based discrimination in all aspects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Daniele Archibugi, “When are International Criminal Tribunals Effective?,” 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163-general/50572-when-are-international-
criminal-tribunals-effective.html. 
7 Dallman, “Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,” 3. 
8 UN Women, “Facts & Figures on Peace & Security.” 
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women’s lives, but women’s status in both places remain tremendously low.9 For 
example, Sierra Leone has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, where 
50-74% of births are not attended by a medical professional or midwife.10 Furthermore, 
female genital mutilation (FGM) is almost universal in the country even though the 
elimination of FGM is recommended in the CEDAW treaty.11 
When writing about gender-based violence, it is imperative to look at the big 
picture and therefore, the colonial history and civil war period for both Liberia and Sierra 
Leone must be detailed. For Liberia, a civil war began in 1989, lasting until April 1996, 
after Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) overthrew the 
government of Samuel Doe.12 Various peacekeeping forces, interim governments, and 
ceasefires were established throughout the period in attempts to end the fighting. Over 
seven different groups were engaged in the conflict until Charles Taylor was elected 
president in early 1997, when a second civil war began, which ran until 2003.13 
Therefore, the period examined in this study will include both civil wars, from 1989-
2003. Both civil wars in Liberia were well-known for high levels of displacement, 
civilian casualties, and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. In addition to 
systemic sexual violence during the war, post-conflict gender-based violence has 
remained prevalent in the country.  
From 1991 to early 2002, Sierra Leone was engaged in a civil war as part of a 
spillover from a civil war occurring in neighboring Liberia. As the United Nations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Joni Seager, The Penguin Atlas of Women in the World (New York: Penguin, 2009), 14-15. 
10 Ibid, 40. 
11 Ibid, 55. 
12 Shana Swiss, Peggy J. Jennings, Gladys V. Aryee, Grace H. Brown, Ruth M. Jappah-Samukai, Mary S. 
Kamara, Rosana D. H. Schaack, Rojatu S. Turay-Kanneh, “Violence Against Women During the Liberian 
Civil Conflict,” The Journal of the American Medical Association (1998): 625. 
13 Ibid, 625. 
	  
 5 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) details, fighters from the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) with support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) attempted to overthrow the government 
of Joseph Momoh in March 1991.14 Other actors included the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and a faction of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the Civil 
Defense Force (CDF). The war in Sierra Leone is known for the recruitment of child 
soldiers, in addition to sexual violence and rape, where it is estimated that over 50,000 
people were killed over the course of the war.15 Since the end of the war, sexual violence 
against women and children has remained widespread as well. 
 While Sierra Leone and Liberia possess many similar characteristics, one visible 
difference is their respective heads of state. Liberia voted in the first female head of state 
in Africa, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, while Sierra Leone has a male president, 
Ernest Bai Koroma, elected in 2007. Sirleaf was elected in 2005 and was successfully re-
elected in 2011. In addition, Sirleaf won the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize, along with two 
other women, becoming the first women to win the prize since 2004.16  
  Although these atrocities have taken place in almost every major conflict around 
the world, their virtual silence, especially outside of the academic world, has contributed 
to my interest in studying them. Perhaps even more than wartime rape during conflict, 
post-conflict rape is invisible. One of the first articles pointing to post-conflict sexual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 United Nations, “Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Background,” 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html. 
15 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 103. 
16 Alan Cowell, Laura Kasinof, and Adam Nossiter, “Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to Three Activists,”  The 
New York Times, last modified October 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/world/nobel-peace-
prize-johnson-sirleaf-gbowee-karman.html?_r=1&ref=nobelprizes. 
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violence was by New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof in 2009.17 Rape as a weapon 
of war is a peace and security issue and an impediment to national and international re-
establishment.18 If peace is to be maintained, women must fully participate in post-
conflict reconstuction and reconciliation.19 Therefore, post-conflict sexual violence most 
definitely poses an overall security issue. It is an obstacle to women’s participation and 
the country’s development and must be examined.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Post-conflict sexual violence is not widely studied within the literature on rape as 
a weapon of war. Aside from news articles, few scholarly articles or books focus on the 
issue, making it essential to explore. Scholars writing on the subject of “rape as a weapon 
of war” have attempted to present answers to questions such as: What causes rape as a 
weapon of war to be used so systematically in cases of armed conflict? Why are more 
men the victims of torture or murder while women and children make up the majority of 
sexual violence victims? And would the international response be more swift if the 
victims were mostly men? 
 Historical explanations of why rape as a weapon of war occurs, sometimes 
referred to as c’est la guerre, include the idea that rapes, much like other casualties, are a 
simple byproduct of conflict. Rape has certainly been a component of war prior to World 
War II, dating back to accounts in the Torah, the rape of the Sabine women during early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Nicolas D. Kristof, “After Wars, Mass Rapes Persist,” The New York Times, last modified May 20, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/opinion/21kristof.html?ref=nicholasdkristof. 
18 Letitia Anderson, “Politics by Other Means: When does Sexual Violence Threaten International Peace 
and Security?,” International Peacekeeping (2010): 245. 
19 United Nations, “Press Release SC/6942,” United Nations, last modified October 31, 2000, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001031.sc6942.doc.html. 
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Roman history, as well as Genghis Khan in the 13th century.20 Much of the current 
writing challenges the notion that it is merely a byproduct of war. Such a view of rape 
only perpetuates its use.21  
With history focusing little on wars’ impact on women, the literature on rape as a 
weapon of war is somewhat new. Studies that focus on civil war mostly emphasize what 
Michele Leiby calls “general human security issues,” namely deaths and disappearances, 
and less on examining the experiences of men and women during wartime as being 
different and complex.22 
Different scholars define and operationalize the term “rape” in various ways. It is 
important to understand what is meant by the term as it applies to wartime violence. 
Cassandra Clifford defines rape as “…Forced vaginal, anal, or oral sex, of either a male 
or a female with either a person or an object.”23 Wartime rape is often combined with the 
“traditional” definition of rape, while including “…Single and multiple instances of rape, 
gang rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation and sexual slavery.”24 Many scholars 
use standardized definitions such as the ones provided by Clifford and often use “sexual 
violence,” “sexual assault,” and “rape” as something interchangeable, such as Kathryn 
Farr, because all forms and situations are unwanted and often coerced.25 Furthermore, 
Doris Buss asserts, “‘Rape as a weapon of war’ thus refers to sexual violence as having a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Madeline Morris, “By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture,” Duke Law Journal (1996): 656; 
Cassandra Clifford, “Rape as a Weapon of War and it’s Long-term Effects on Victims and Society,” 
(proceedings, Budapest, 2008), 4; Jonathan Gottschall, “Explaining Wartime Rape,” The Journal of Sex 
Research (2004): 129. 
21 Ibid, 4. 
22 Michele Leiby, “Wartime Sexual Violence in Guatemala and Peru,” International Studies Quarterly 
(2009): 446. 
23 Clifford, “Rape as a Weapon of War,” 4. 
24 Ibid, 4. 
25 Kathryn Farr, “Extreme War Rape in Today’s Civil-War-Torn States: A Contextual and Comparative 
Analysis,” Gender Issues (2009): 4. 
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systematic, pervasive, or officially orchestrated aspect, emphasizing that rapes ‘…Are not 
random acts, but appear to be carried out as deliberate policy.’”26 Throughout the 
remainder of this work, Clifford’s definition of rape as well as wartime rape will be used, 
in addition to Buss’.  
Prior to the sexual violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda in the 1990s, 
rape as a weapon of war was a fairly new subject within the comparative politics field. 
Because of this, much of the literature can tend to be explanative where authors focus 
their writing on explaining or creating new theories surrounding why wartime rape 
occurs. Much of the literature is examined through case study research, using either 
comparative cases or single cases. Other literature has focused on a particular aspect of 
wartime violence, such as violence perpetrated by armed “soldiers,” using hegemonic 
masculinity and the concept of a “military culture” as a unit of analysis. The emphasis 
placed around soldiers is essential in cases such as these because oftentimes, the 
perpetrators are pseudo-soldiers. They may not have been formally trained into a national 
branch of the military but instead are members of a group, simply fighting with weapons. 
Another theme that pertains to my study is impunity, especially as it pertains to wartime 
rape and sexual violence. As stated, other themes within the literature exist, such as 
examining wartime rape against males, but for purposes of this specific research, theory, 
the soldiered aspect of the literature, and impunity are explored further. 
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Theory 
 Theories on wartime rape have developed steadily over time and the four major 
“schools,” or theories surrounding wartime rape are 1) feminist theories, 2) the cultural 
pathology theory, 3) the strategic rape theory, and 4) the biosocial theory.27 These four 
theories are important to explore because they show the division that persists within the 
subject as well as what is explained within each school and what is still missing. 
 Susan Brownmiller in 1975 was the first to raise consciousness and systematically 
research rape as a weapon of war.28 Scholars such as Anne Llewellyn Barstow, Indai 
Lourdes Sajor, and Alexandra Stiglmayer followed her lead, asserting that rape in 
general, whether in war or peace, is a crime rooted in misogyny that perpetuate a 
patriarchal structure within society, where men declare their dominance over women, and 
is systemic in the sense that, in general, all men are empowered while all women are 
subordinated.29  
 Within the feminist theories, there is the growing assumption that simply adding 
more women to positions of power is adding to gender equality around the world. For 
example, writers Theo-Ben Gurirab and Pia Cayetano of the UN Chronicle state that with 
women’s increasing participation in political systems around the world that issues 
concerning women, such as gender-based violence, have been brought to light and have 
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29 Gottschall, “Explaining Wartime Rape,” 130-131; Anne Llewellyn Barstow, War's Dirty Secret: Rape, 
Prostitution, and other Crimes Against Women (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2000); Indai Lourdes Sajor, 
Common Grounds: Violence against Women in War and Armed Conflict Situations (Quezon City: 
ASCENT Asian Center for Women's Human Rights, 1998); Alexandra Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War 
Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). 
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been given more attention than ever.30 There is also the assumption that adding more 
women into these positions will bring women’s issues and feminist policies to the 
forefront. While this may be true, simply adding more women to male-dominated 
political systems does not mean that inequality will be eradicated. This assumption views 
women as a homogenous group, meaning that their sole concern is women’s issues, 
simply because they are women.  
 The cultural pathology theory uses sociocultural factors and cultural 
psychoanalysis in attempts to explain why sexual violence occurs at such high levels 
during wartime.31 This theory looks at a nation or society’s history as a means of 
explanation, such as Iris Chang’s study conducted on the rape of Nanking. Some within 
this school use culture as a level of analysis while others such as Madeline Morris and 
Catherine MacKinnon use military structure as a way to analyze across societies.32 While 
helpful for specific cases, it does not help explain the occurrences as a whole, across 
societies.33 There have been some attempts at generalizations, however, including a 
cross-cultural study by Peggy Reeves Sanday in 1981 where she analyzes various 
societies around the world in order to categorize them as either “rape free” or “rape 
prone.”34 Sanday found that in societies where resources were scarce and “…Females 
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last modified February 25, 2010, United Nations, 
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icsfightviolenceagainstwomen. 
31 Gottschall, “Explaining Wartime Rape,” 131. 
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Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. Alexandra Stiglmayer et. al (Lincoln: The 
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Culture,” in Wars Dirty Secret: Rape, Prostitution, and Other Crimes Against Women, ed. Anne Llewellyn 
Barstow et. al (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2000). 
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 11 
[were] perceived as objects to be controlled as men struggle to retain or to gain control of 
their environment.”35 However, her study does not explain rape outside of those, which 
she labels “tribal societies.” While she studies societies from around the world, rape most 
certainly occurs outside of these so-called tribal societies, for which no explanations are 
presented. 
 The strategic rape theory is a widely accepted notion of why widespread wartime 
rape occurs. Beginning with Susan Brownmiller in 1975, this theory explains that rape 
during wartime is another weapon that militaries and civilians can use against their 
enemies, particularly women, and that it serves “larger strategic objectives.”36 As detailed 
by Jonathan Gottschall, “It is credited with spreading debilitating terror, diminishing the 
resistance of civilians, and demoralizing, humiliating, and emasculating enemy soldiers 
who are thereby shown to have failed in their most elemental protective duties.”37 
 For example, within the strategic rape theory, countless scholars point to the 
psychological, physical, and social consequences of sexual violence, as experienced 
mostly by women. Furthermore, authors such as Michele Leiby and December Green 
look at wartime rape as being a symbolic, political, and social act.38 Because wartime 
rape was traditionally regarded as inevitable, any responsibility was taken off of the 
perpetrators and all culpability was placed in the hands of the victim. 
 The fourth contending theory is the biosocial, or the biology-based theory, used to 
explain wartime rape. This is commonly referred to as the “pressure-cooker” theory that 
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(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, “Rape 
in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity,” SAIS Review (1994). 
37 Gottschall, “Explaining Wartime Rape,” 131. 
38 Leiby, “Wartime Sexual Violence in Guatemala and Peru;” December Green, Gender Violence in 
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view men as possessing sexual aggression instincts that are heightened under the 
conditions of wartime.39 The “pressure-cooker” theory is based on the aggression model 
pioneered by Sigmund Freud and ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz.40 The biosocial 
theory, however, does not use sociocultural factors, such as power and strategy, to 
explain any behavior other than “sexual aggression.”41 One of the major problems of this 
theory is the inability to explain post-conflict sexual violence. In addition, a great deal of 
variation exists among conflicts, in terms of the reported levels of wartime rape and 
sexual. This leads to the question, why don’t all soldiers engage in wartime rape?42 
 The feminist theories, cultural pathology theory, strategic rape theory, and 
biosocial theory help to contextualize the work that has been done regarding sexual 
violence and how it has been used as a weapon of war throughout history. It is important 
to understand the theories as well as their evolution over time. The remainder of this 
literature review will address two recurring themes, the soldiered aspect and impunity, 
and how theory fits within each. 
 
The Soldiered Aspect 
 Much of the literature focuses on the role of militaries and paramilitaries in how 
sexual violence is perpetrated. The reason many scholars choose to focus on this aspect 
of sexual violence is because often times, armed combatants, whether part of a formal or 
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informal military structure, comprise the largest proportion of perpetrators.43 Scholars 
such as Maria Erikkson Baaz and Maria Stern, Lisa Price, and Julianne Kippenberg use 
various testimonies from armed combatants, in attempts to understand why rape and 
sexual violence persist as a method of violence during wartime. For example, Baaz and 
Stern focuses on soldier testimonies in an effort to examine the ways in which the 
soldiers themselves understand their crimes.44 As Baaz and Stern state, “Rape in this 
sense is seen as serving a triple purpose: it represents the “spoils” of war, and it is a 
symbolic message of dominance to the conquered (men) and to all women.”45 Scholars 
such as Christopher Butler, Tali Gluch, and Neil Mitchell have also pointed to the lack of 
accountability for perpetrators, to be addressed below.46 
The majority of the scholars presented here, including Price,47 have pointed to the 
“strategic purposes” that wartime rape has, i.e. the strategic rape theory, while authors 
such as Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell question whether there are more reasons that soldiers 
commit these acts of violence. According to Butler et al., “…Women are vulnerable 
during armed conflicts and wartime, but also more vulnerable in countries where there is 
a low level of control over public officials. Security forces are not all alike and differ in 
levels of discipline…Even warfare is not an equal hell.”48 This coincides with Green’s 
idea that all rapes are different but not completely incomparable.49  
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Many scholars such as Green, as well as Baaz and Stern point out problems with 
the “biological make-up” theory and the “sexual urge” explanation that is sometimes used 
to explain soldiers’ tendency to commit rape during wartime.50 Researchers often use 
testimonies of soldiers to “debunk” the biological differences argument and often point to 
military socialization as a reason for increased levels of rape during wartime. As 
illustrated by Baaz and Stern, “Instead of seeing the military as a venue through which 
boys can achieve their natural potential as men, research underscores how men⁄boys (and 
women⁄girls) learn to be “masculine” and violent in the military through methods 
specifically designed to create soldiers who are able (and willing) to kill to protect the 
state⁄nation.”51 Through testimonies, scholars such as Baaz and Stern and Kippenberg 
point out how wartime rape is “normalized” but yet “wrong” at the same time.52  
The inequalities faced by women are used as a way to uphold a social structure, 
specifically a patriarchal structure where women are perceived of as “wealth” in need of 
security and protection where the rapist, whether soldier or civilian, symbolically takes 
the wealth of another man.53 As Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Lausten explain, 
“Strategic rape attacks not only the victim but also aims to dissolve the social structure of 
the attacked group…In war, the abuse of the enemy’s women is considered to be the 
ultimate humiliation, a stamp of total conquest.”54Authors such as Green and Leiby agree 
with Buss, where she states “…Women are, in effect, the “symbolic representations” of 
the body politic, to be protected during war as the very nation itself. Women thus become 
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the embodied boundaries of the nation-state, and as such, are targets for violence directed 
against a national collectivity.”55 
Authors such as Green and organizations such as Amnesty International agree that 
sexual violence during wartime is indeed a political act where women are seen as the 
booty for opposing soldiers and are raped as property where “The tendency to consider 
mass rape as a crime against the family or nation is rooted in a near universal 
understanding of rape as a crime of property.”56 According to Green, this understanding 
ignores that women are also the enemy and instead only views mass rape as the rape of 
“the enemy’s women” and simply reflects the inequalities that women face in their daily 
lives.57 For example in the DR Congo, women’s low status in society has come under 
examination as a reason for the consistent violence perpetrated against them. Human 
Rights Watch author Joanne Csete states, “The law as well as social norms defined the 
role of women and girls as subordinate to men. Although women are often a major—if 
not the only— source of support for the family, the Congolese Family Code requires 
them to obey their husbands who are recognized as the head of the household.”58 
Furthermore, authors such as Baaz and Stern as well as Ngwarsungu Chiwengo 
point out the media attention, or lack thereof, that explore the “intentions” of the soldiers 
and paints them as different.59 This process is seen as “othering,” where specifically 
African wars appear as primitive, where soldiers are projected as “…Brutal vengeful 
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killers and rapists who mutilate and eat their victims.”60 Chiwengo argues that the media 
coverage on the Congo “foregrounds the brutality and violence” that echoes the 
disinterest in and disregard for African politics, similar to the “othering” described by 
Baaz and Stern.61 For instance, this “othering” that the media engages in, allows for those 
outside of Africa to distance themselves from the atrocities and blame it on “African 
societies.” 
The understanding and exploration of why soldiers commit acts of rape and 
sexual violence are long studied. However, it is imperative to understand the conditions 
under which these acts are committed and how they contribute to the continuation of 
abuse long after the formal cessation of hostilities, as described below.  
 
Impunity and Wartime Rape 
 Impunity and wartime rape go hand-in-hand, both during and after war. The lack 
of accountability for rape, in effect cultural permission for it, is often one of the biggest 
impediments to eliminating wartime sexual violence, as well as other human rights 
offenses. Firstly, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights defines impunity as 
“…The impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to 
account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings…” 
[emphasis added].62 Many analysts and anti-violence activists recognize that ending 
impunity is one of the means to ending wartime sexual violence. According to Margot 
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Wallström, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict, “Women have no rights, if those who violate their rights go unpunished…” with 
impunity being the “…rule rather than the exception.”63 
 Authors such as Buss argue against the view long held by (mostly male) 
historians that rape is a simple byproduct of war, and that it has happened in virtually 
every armed conflict around the world and will continue to be a result of future 
conflicts.64 As stated by Buss, “…Rape was a weapon used against women by men in 
both ‘peace’ and ‘war’ times. But in wartime, she argued, rape is both an attack on 
women (as women) and part of an attack against ‘the enemy’.”65 This “byproduct” notion 
that Buss argues against is central to the issue because it not only historically accepts that 
wartime rape has happened, it also acknowledges that it will continue to be experienced. 
Essentially, without the reversal of the “byproduct” notion, wartime rape will continue in 
the future, because little action will be taken to stop it. 
 Roland Littlewood, Elvan Isikozlu, Baaz and Stern, and Kippenberg all touch 
upon the issue of soldiers experiencing “total impunity at all levels,” including the 
community level.66 In the case of the DRC, Kippenberg points out the fact that the lack of 
security and political will to combat sexual violence leads to the lack of prosecution and 
rampant freedom.67 Littlewood points to the anonymity and opportunity (and impunity) 
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as causes for why soldiers commit these acts, with Isikozlu indicating that the liberty 
leads to “opportunistic rape.”68  
 The ICC designated rape as a crime against humanity in 2008, yet as of October 
2011, only twelve of the 26 arrest warrants and summonses from the ICC related to 
charges of rape and/or sexual slavery, showing that the ICC is unlikely to work as a 
deterrent.69 However, the first major trial to focus on rape as a weapon of war, is that of a 
former Vice President, Jean-Pierre Bemba (from the DRC), for hundreds of rapes 
perpetrated by militias he commanded in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2002.70  
 The mandate of the ICC is to punish perpetrators for the most serious crimes 
committed during conflict around the world.71 Unfortunately, due to limited resources, 
the ICC is often unable to prosecute all the individuals, where domestic courts often 
come into play and “low level suspects” are handed over to them.72 In regards to the ICC 
mandate as it pertains to rape as a weapon of war, the intellectual architects of policy, or 
“big fish,” are often those that are sought for prosecution. In 2008, the ICC introduced a 
new initiative to continue with the investigations of these “low level suspects” and then 
turn the evidence over to local judges in hopes of eliminating immunity and also 
increasing responsibility.73 
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 To summarize, the literature on rape as a weapon of war is diverse. Many of the 
authors discussed here focus on issues concerning why these crimes occur (on a 
theoretical level), the motives behind them, military and non-military use, and continued 
impunity for the offenses. Gaps remain within the literature but one of the main gaps is 
the study of rape and sexual violence after formal conflict has ended. For example, many 
of the post-conflict studies or articles look at the reintegration of these victims into 
society, psychological support, peace negotiations, and tribunals but few focus on the 
sexual violence that continues after the war is over. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 Using Liberia and Sierra Leone, a comparative case study explores the research 
question of what factors are correlated with the continuance of widespread acts of 
wartime rape even after the cessation of official conflict. The comparative case study 
tests the hypotheses that governments in which there are high levels of female 
representation will be associated with lower levels of impunity for sexual assault and this 
will result in lower levels of sexual violence. 
 For the two respective cases, a longitudinal analysis of both the civil war and 
post-conflict periods are conducted to establish the levels of sexual violence during and 
after war. For Liberia, this constitutes the fourteen years from 1989-2003 to be 
categorized as the period of civil war and 2003 to the present to be categorized as the 
post-conflict period. For Sierra Leone, the years from 1991-2002 are understood as the 
conflict period with 2002 to the present serving as the post-conflict period under review. 
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 As described by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, case studies in general 
examine a feature of a historical episode or event and attempt to test current theories 
surrounding the event or develop new explanations that could be used to help describe 
other events or phenomena.74 As George and Bennett explain, “A single study cannot 
address all the interesting aspects of a historical event. It is important to recognize that a 
single event can be relevant for research on a variety of theoretical topics.”75 This is 
important to remember throughout the exploration of post-conflict sexual violence, 
because while the outcome may not provide a new theory, it helps in the development of 
future theories, especially in “deviant cases” such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, which 
existing theories do not adequately explain.76 
 The method of process tracing is used in order to “trace” links between the cases 
in attempts to “…See whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a 
case in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables…”77 In both 
of these cases, high levels of post-conflict sexual violence has occurred and for that 
reason, both serve as distinct examples to use.  
 In addition to process tracing, the congruence method is used for hypothesis 
testing as well as theory development. For George and Bennett, “The essential 
characteristic of the congruence method is that the investigator begins with a theory and 
then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case.”78 
For case study research, the congruence method is appealing to use because a large 
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proportion of data is not necessary.79 This is important to my research because gathering 
reliable and accurate data in regards to sexual violence is largely impossible. As George 
and Bennett state, the congruence method is then combined with the method of process-
tracing to identify the causal chain of how the independent variable indicates the result of 
the dependent variable.80 For example, in this study, the congruence method combined 
with process-tracing shows how levels of post-conflict sexual violence (the dependent 
variable) are affected by the independent variables listed below. Furthermore, while 
George and Bennett speak of identifying a causal chain, this study aims to identify 
correlated factors, as a definite causal chain cannot be determined given the nature of my 
independent and dependent variables.  
 Furthermore, the combination of the congruence method and process-tracing 
address the problem of a “lack of controlled comparison.”81 Controlled comparison 
requires the ability to find cases that are similar in every aspect except one, a difficult 
requirement to fulfill.82 But as George and Bennett state, this is not necessary if both 
process-tracing and the congruence method are used together because they “…can be 
compared by drawing them together within a common theoretical framework without 
having to find two or more cases that are similar in every respect but one.”83 
 
VARIABLES 
 Using the original research question asking what factors are correlated with the 
continuance of widespread acts of wartime rape even after the cessation of official 
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conflict, the dependent variable is post-conflict sexual violence, using official, state-
declared dates demarcating the cessation of war (2003 for Liberia and 2002 for Sierra 
Leone). The independent variables observed for each case are (1) the levels of impunity, 
or freedom to commit sexual violence acts, within both countries as experienced before, 
during conflict and after, and (2) female representation in government. Therefore, this 
study will examine: (1) levels of impunity for rape before, during war and after, (2) levels 
of rape during and after war, and (3) female representation in government. 
 Measuring wartime rape is especially difficult. In cases such as these, it is 
important to understand the underreporting of rape and sexual violence. A variety of 
problems cast doubt on the reliability of the data on sexual violence. Some women in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have reported that they have been assaulted on 
more than one occasion, in turn, how would this be accounted for and how does it change 
the measurement?84 As addressed by Leiby, “In war-torn countries the necessary social 
services and infrastructure may be lacking, preventing victims who otherwise would 
report the crime from doing so. Moreover, many victims are reluctant to report sexual 
crimes under any circumstance.”85 This inability can be attributed to the fact that 
peacekeepers and aid workers are sometimes not allowed in the country, cannot reach 
certain areas of the conflict zone, or are the perpetrators themselves.  
 Also, numbers can be politicized and used as a reason to continue the conflict. As 
ICC analyst Xabier Agirre Aranburu describes, “…Rape has been widely reported and 
highlighted for reasons of political expediency or ‘atrocity propaganda’ in a number of 
cases…” including in the DRC during the time of independence in the late 1950s and 
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early 1960s and the alleged rape of white women by Native Americans in the United 
States during the 19th century.86 Because of the stigma of being assaulted and raped in 
addition to the lack of basic infrastructure needs and access, hospital admission numbers 
are not considered a reliable source for estimates regarding the levels of sexual violence. 
Various estimates have been made in regards to both cases. For example, Physicians for 
Human Rights (PHR) surveyed in 2001 that one in eight households in Sierra Leone 
(13%) reported incidents of wartime sexual violence, ranging from 50,000-64,000 
women.87 Keeping these difficulties in mind, as much reliable data will be gathered as 
possible. Fortunately, both Sierra Leone and Liberia have a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). Liberia’s was established in 2005 and Sierra Leone’s was 
established in 2002. Both will be used for data collection in regards to sexual violence 
during and after the conflict.  
 Furthermore, there have been numerous studies conducted in regards to sexual 
violence during war, including research by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
and the United Nations, among others. Because the research question focuses on post-
conflict sexual violence, it will be important to gather as much post-conflict data as 
possible, as well as during each conflict. 
 The two independent variables, impunity and a female-headed government, are 
examined using various sources. Firstly, to view the various levels of impunity associated 
with rape, armed actors, official or unofficial, pro and anti-government, those that have 
been prosecuted for wartime rape or sexual violence within either official conflict are 
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examined. Levels of impunity can be measured in various ways. One way is to research 
the number of prosecutions in regards to sexual violence during the war, and also after. A 
second way is to examine laws or policies passed by either Sierra Leone or Liberia that 
address the sexual violence atrocities. Also, this study examines whether or not wide-
scale acts of sexual violence are government supported. “Government supported” does 
not only mean acts of commission in that government actors are urging and taking part in 
the rape women and children. In this study, “government supported,” i.e. acts of 
omission, will be understood to mean denial or ignorance in prevention or action against 
those that have committed the sexual violence.  
 Secondly, female representation in governments are measured by gathering data 
on the percentage of women who serve on the local, state, and national levels, including 
the heads of state. Government websites and organizations are used to gather this 
information. The Global Peace Index, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean government websites are used for various measurements parliamentary 
numbers. 
 To conclude, this study uses a combination of both process-tracing and the 
congruence method to test the hypothesis that governments in which there are high levels 
of female representation will be associated with lower levels of impunity for sexual 
assault and this will result in lower levels of sexual violence. The study seeks to 
contribute to the development of theory on rape as a weapon of war and sexual violence 
in post-conflict societies so as to better understand the problem and draw attention to it. 
  
25 
II. HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE 
 
 This chapter will discuss the roots of conflict and provide an overview of the civil 
wars in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and Liberia (1989-2003). It will also serve as a 
foundation to the research question: what factors are correlated with the continuance of 
widespread acts of rape even after the cessation of official conflict? The origins of each 
conflict, including descriptions of their colonial histories will serve as the background 
against which the struggles began. An account of both civil wars, in addition to the pre-
war status of women in Liberia and Sierra Leone, will then be included to serve as a 
contextual basis for understanding the sexual violence that occurred and the sexual 
violence that persists post-conflict, both to be discussed in later chapters. 
 
ROOTS OF CONFLICT: LIBERIA 
 
 Unlike Sierra Leone, Liberia is regarded as one of the only countries in Africa 
that was not directly colonized, with the exception of Ethiopia. However, it was in many 
ways informally colonized by the U.S. and because of the United States’ influence in the 
country, it is seen as America’s colony in Africa. Prior to the pseudo-American 
colonization, many different ethnic groups and people lived in Liberia. Among the first 
groups to settle in the territory included the Bassa, Kru, Gola, Kissi, and the Deys.88 It is 
believed that inhabitants have lived in present-day Liberia for more than 700 years, prior 
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to being inhabited by former slaves from the U.S.89 Many inhabitants migrated after 
instability in well-known empires such as in Mali, where “These earliest immigrants to 
pre-Liberia brought with them the skills of cotton spinning, cloth weaving, iron smelting, 
rice cultivation, and models of social and political institutions.”90 
 Similar to the way in which freed slaves resettled in Sierra Leone towards the end 
of the 1780s, 80 former slaves did the same in Liberia in 1822 with the help of the U.S. 
government and the American Colonization Society (ACS) and by 1900, over 16,000 
African Americans had settled in Liberia.91 Predictably, the original class of settlers from 
America, called Americo-Liberians, often had clashes with the indigenous Africans; as 
their way of life was different, ranging from religion to language, and was even denied 
citizenship until 1904.92 As stated by Monday Abasiattai, “Both the Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian repatriates emigrated primarily from a desire for unfettered freedom from White 
oppression and an opportunity to develop in all spheres of human endeavor, including, in 
Liberia’s case the building of a great independent Black nation.”93 Many of the settlers 
were viewed as having an American outlook and orientation and Liberia’s political 
system was modeled on the U.S. system.94  
 When the former slaves migrated to Liberia from the United States in 1822, they 
most certainly expected more rights than they enjoyed in the U.S. as blacks. With them 
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they brought a constitution for the territory, drawn up by the ACS, which allocated a 
centralization of power to a governor, typically a white ACS member, although Liberians 
(and African-Americans) themselves were accorded all rights that were allocated to white 
American citizens at the time.95 The ACS, however, gave up its power in 1841 as the last 
governor, Thomas Buchanan, died.96 Similar to the way in which other territories of 
Africa were regarded as a “white man’s grave,” so too was Liberia, as all of the other 
governors had died, and soon the ACS lost interest in governing the country.97  
 During 19th century, Liberia engaged in trade in natural resources and agriculture 
such as iron ore, rubber, coffee, and cocoa. This trade aided in establishing a wealthy 
class of Americo-Liberians, who soon took political power and requested formal 
independence from the ACS.98 The country was officially granted independence in July 
of 1847 and Joseph Roberts was elected Liberia’s first president in 1848.99 While Liberia 
elected its first president in 1848, women were not able to vote, nor were men that were 
not categorized as “Americo-Liberians,” therefore it can be concluded that only one 
portion of society was represented in this presidential election and it was hardly 
democratic.100 While the ACS gave up its power in Liberia, it would not be the end of 
U.S. influence in the country. The governments of Liberia following independence 
continued to show a pro-Western attitude in regards to political systems, U.S. investment 
and influence, and other foreign investment, to be discussed later. 
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 After independence, the central government, dominated by Americo-Liberians, 
began to expand, annex territory, and sign formal treaties. The national system of 
government soon took precedence over “tribal” systems.101 During this time, the Liberian 
national government would provide some form of education, schools, and protection in 
exchange for Africans’ acceptance of national sovereignty over the tribal systems.102 
Under this “agreement,” national laws took precedent over traditional forms of law and 
rules. This instituted what Dr. M. B. Akpan calls the “sphere of influence.” Prior to 
independence, the central government mostly operated in the capital city of Monrovia 
and surrounding areas. The rural areas were mostly controlled by tribal systems and had 
little to do with the central government. Under Roberts, however, the government began 
expanding, therefore extending the sphere of influence that the government had. For 
example, in the 1850s the Roberts government began seizing the mineral and resource 
rich hinterlands, although some of their annexed territory soon became property of the 
British and French after the “scramble for Africa” at the Berlin Conference of 1884.103  
 Also during this time, the central government in Liberia in the 19th and 20th 
centuries used what became known as “colorism.” Colorism set up a hierarchy, based on 
skin color and had originated in the U.S. plantation system and was later adopted in 
Liberia during this time to establish a stratified social system. This caste system was 
mostly comprised of four distinctions, with Americo-Liberians of lighter complexion 
resting at the top of the hierarchy and were often those with the most political and social 
power. The two middle classes were comprised mostly of darker skinned Americo-
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Liberians and small farmers, with the indigenous Africans encompassing the lowest level 
of the social hierarchy.104 Like all other societies with caste systems, the highest of the 
hierarchy, in this case the Americo-Liberians, held the most power and were afforded the 
most opportunities. 
 The animosity caused by colorism and various struggles over power and resources 
between the different ethnic groups and classes can be seen as the underlying cause to the 
civil war beginning in the 1990s. With a population of 3.5 million, it is estimated that 18 
different ethnic groups resided within the country during the time of colonial settlement 
in the 19th century, but the primary cleavage was between Americo-Liberians (three 
percent of the population) and indigenous Liberians (97 percent of the population).105 As 
Robin Dunn-Marcos et al. detail:  
The Americo-Liberian settlers, representing Western culture, considered it their 
Christian duty to replace the “barbarous” customs, religion, and political 
institutions of indigenous Liberians with their own “superior” values, practices, 
and institutions. Indigenous Liberians in turn viewed the Americo-Liberians as 
liberated slaves, who should occupy a lower status in society than themselves.106  
Similar to the ways in which the small wealthy “white” population ruled the majority 
impoverished black population in South Africa, so too was the case in Liberia. The 
exception was that the ruling class in Liberia was also black. Their “native policy” 
involved two aspects: assimilation and indirect rule. Assimilation mostly involved 
replacing non-Americo-Liberian customs, religion, and political institutions. The policies 
were implemented inconsistently due to a lack of funds and because of its essential 
failure, the use of indirect rule became the official government policy beginning in 
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1904.107 For many observers, the majority population of Liberia was being largely 
victimized by the minority Americo-Liberians, similar to the way the British and French 
ran their colonies. Because of this, Liberia’s sovereignty was questioned by the League of 
Nations in 1930.108 
 After selected international pressure was placed on the Americo-Liberian 
government, President William Tubman adopted a “unification policy” and cultural 
assimilation and indirect rule was abandoned in 1960, 30 years after the country’s 
sovereignty was questioned by the League of Nations, Britain, France, and Germany.109 
Moreso than in the past, indigenous Africans were encouraged to join the political 
process where the government allowed more indigenous representatives in the 
legislature.110 The government also initiated a “Policy of Integration” where indigenous 
Liberians were able to administer their affairs, manage their own courts, and were raised 
to citizen status in 1960.111 These policies provided a psychological improvement for the 
Liberians as they were able to take more pride in their cultural identities and were no 
longer considered second class citizens by the government.112  
 In the 1950s and 1960s, the president pursued what he called an “open door 
policy” and encouraged foreign investment throughout the country, particularly in the 
iron ore and rubber industries.113 For example, over 300 million USD was invested 
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during this time in iron-ore mining alone.114 Despite the façade of economic 
accomplishments, Tubman ruled through an economic patronage system and suppressed 
the opposition to stay in power.115 Despite this, Liberia became an ally and military 
source for the U.S. during the height of the Cold War. Liberia often sided with the U.S. at 
the UN and also supported the U.S. in Vietnam.116 Because of Tubman’s pro-U.S. stance, 
the U.S. often looked the other way in regards to his dictatorial leadership. As Reed 
Kramer writes, “…Liberia steered a decidedly pro-American course as the Cold War 
engulfed the globe. The United States set up a permanent mission to train the Liberian 
military and began bringing Liberian officers to American institutions for further training. 
In 1959, Liberia concluded a mutual defense pact with the United States.”117 
 While in office, Tubman died in 1971 after 27 years as president. His vice 
president, William Tolbert, finished Tubman’s term as “provisional president” and in 
1972, he was inaugurated as president, and began his four-year term.118 After Tolbert was 
installed as president, he pursued an innovative foreign policy, relaxed the political 
system, and emphasized a system that was based more on merit than patronage, making it 
more inclusive to the Liberian Africans (although he continued to represent the interests 
of the Americo-Liberian elite).119 These inclusions were significant because it helped 
decrease the amount of disparity between the Liberian Africans and the Americo-
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Liberians, although general inequality persisted in the realms of education and 
employment opportunities.120 For example, as Robert Rinehart details: 
…Liberia remained essentially the province of a tightly knit oligarchy. For all the 
attempted liberalization of the previous two decades, the upper levels of 
government and the economy were still controlled by about a dozen interrelated 
Americo-Liberian families…By questionable methods, family members obtained 
monopolies in the fishing, transportation, and food catering industries and on sale 
of charcoal used by the urban poor for cooking and heating…In addition to 
unbridled nepotism, the Tolbert administration failed to bring corruption under 
control.121 
 
In addition to these problems, Tolbert did not have as much control as Tubman in regards 
to his True Whig Party, and often had to “bargain” with older members of the party, 
despite the fact that much of Tolbert’s extended family were members of his 
government.122 Also, unlike Tubman, Tolbert took a more “nonaligned” stance in regards 
to the Cold War where he established relations with Eastern bloc countries such as the 
Soviet Union and also severed ties with Israel.123 Because of this, relations between the 
U.S. and Liberia were strained during Tolbert’s presidency. 
 During Tolbert’s second term as president, the administration attempted to raise 
the price of rice, the country’s main staple, to encourage locally grown rice and avoid the 
influx of people moving into Monrovia.124 During this time, many people were travelling 
from rural areas into the capital in hopes of finding jobs; because of this, Monrovia was 
becoming overpopulated.125 For many observers, however, there were motives other than 
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just overpopulation of the capital. The Minister of Agriculture, Florence Chenoweth, and 
the Tolbert family were rice farmers, and the increased price in rice most certainly 
profited them.126 Because of the increased prices, the 1979 Rice Riots began, where over 
over $40 million worth of damage accumulated, and on April 12, 1980, a coup d’état 
under the leadership of Master Sergeant Samuel Doe resulted in the assassination of 
Tolbert.127  
 Under Doe, Liberian-Africans received a “first-time bias” where the government 
“…Began promoting members of Doe's Krahn ethnic group, who soon dominated 
political and military life in Liberia. This raised ethnic tension and caused frequent 
hostilities between the politically and militarily dominant Krahns and other ethnic groups 
in the country.”128 Because of the promotion practices described above, Doe instituted a 
new tribalism, in effect replacing the Americo-Liberians, where the Krahn, (a minority 
ethnic group making up four percent of the population), was controlling the government, 
army, and resources.129  
 Because of the coup, the country subsequently faced a financial crisis. Much of 
Liberia’s foreign investment was from the U.S., and in turn, Doe rejected socialism and 
communism in hopes of gaining back U.S investment and aid in 1981.130 At the time, the 
U.S. and European countries were the main destinations of Liberian exports and the U.S. 
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supplied the largest percentage of Liberia’s imports.131 Furthermore, Doe received more 
U.S. aid than any other previous leader combined, and visited the U.S. as a guest of 
Reagan.132 For example, “Aid levels rose…for a total of $402 million between 1981 and 
1985, more than the country received during the entire previous century. Ties with the 
Liberian army were strengthened; the military component of the aid package for this 
period was about $15 million, which was used for a greatly enlarged training program, 
barracks construction and equipment.”133 This rise in aid levels was simply another sign 
of how close the ties between the U.S. and Liberia were during this time. 
 After human rights abuses occurred under Doe’s dictatorial regime, the 
international community placed pressure on Doe and elections were held in 1985. 
However, the elections were likely rigged as certain political parties were banned and 
Doe allegedly changed his age on his birth certificate to meet the age requirement.134 
Shortly after in 1990, Doe was captured, tortured, and murdered by Chief Training 
Officer, Prince Yormie Johnson, of the rebel group National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) and the government subsequently collapsed, giving way to the NPFL.135 
 Although Prince Johnson ended the Doe regime, the NPFL was founded and 
controlled by another Liberian: Charles Taylor. Taylor was born near Monrovia in 1948 
during the Tubman administration to a Golan mother and an Americo-Liberian father.136 
Taylor was educated in the U.S. and led demonstrations against the Tolbert 
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administration when Tolbert made a presidential visit to the country.137 Taylor returned to 
Liberia after college and was given a key position within the Doe administration because 
of his education and training background.138 Under Doe, Taylor had been a procurement 
chief, and after allegations that he stole funds from the government, Taylor began to plot 
his retaliation while in exile in the U.S. during the 1980s.139  
 Taylor founded the NPFL with the major goal of ousting Doe from power and 
replacing him. As author Lydia Polgreen details, “In part, Mr. Taylor was adept at using 
and even creating the language of his times. He blended a militant pan-Africanism that 
called for bloody revolutions against neo-colonialism with a muscular vernacular in 
which might was unapologetically right. The new pose fit well with the region's 
mood.”140 During this time, he was able to recruit soldiers from ethnic groups excluded 
under Doe’s regime, (such as the Gio and Mano), living in exile in neighboring countries 
such as Ivory Coast.141 Many of the rebels within the group were also Libyan-trained, as 
was Taylor. In addition to removing Doe out of power, Taylor desperately wanted to 
regain a position within the government, mainly the presidency. Taylor and the NPFL 
were initially described as a “…Network of armed dissidents than a political party or a 
guerrilla army…united by little except their dislike of Samuel Doe…”142 Taylor was able 
to gain support for the NPFL by using the media and maintaining that they had popular 
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support from the people of Liberia.143 After Taylor and the NPFL were assembled, they 
began their fourteen year infiltration into Liberia. 
 
ROOTS OF CONFLICT: SIERRA LEONE 
 
 After being settled by a group of British businessmen in 1787, Sierra Leone was 
used as a colony for freed slaves under the “protection” of the British government.144 
Prior to being settled by the British however, the dominant ethnic groups that inhabited 
the territory were the Mende, Temne, and the Limba.145 Over the course of 2,000 years, 
over 14 ethnic groups occupied the country and because of this, each group had close 
cultural ties to each other, drawing influences from the Mali empire, as well as cultures 
from present-day Guinea and Senegal.146  
 In regards to the British settlement, “…It was to be a self-governing state with ‘a 
constitution, bound by social contract, rooted in history, [and] in the institutions of 
Anglo-Saxon monarchy…”147 In the beginning, British settlers and freed slaves who 
emigrated to Sierra Leone fell victim to diseases and shortages of food, causing the 
British government to establish it as the first Crown Colony in West Africa in 1808. 
Sierra Leone became one of the first British “civilizing missions” in Africa.148 
During this time, the Crown Colony constituted mostly the capital, Freetown, 
where the rest of the territory was seen as a “protectorate” that had its own traditions, 
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languages, and systems.149 As Lansana Gberie details, “The British did not encourage the 
development of a single unitary state and a sense of nation, describing the protectorate as 
‘foreign countries adjoining the colony’; they justified its annexation as ‘in the interest of 
the people.’”150 The colonial administration often promoted Western ideals of religion, 
commerce, and customs and projected the notion that traditional religions and customs 
were inferior.151 This in turn undermined relationships between indigenous groups that 
had co-existed for centuries.152 The colonizers in Freetown, constituting only about 
60,000 people, were considered “non-natives” while the remaining territory, or the 
protectorate, comprised about two million people and were considered “natives.”153 As to 
how they were treated, non-natives received profits from resources, were able to own 
land, had better access to education, hospitals, and clean water.154 In 1924, the British 
attempted to unite the protectorate with the colony through a constitution; however, the 
British colonial administration maintained most of the control and was mostly viewed as 
a failure where little change occurred for the Africans.  
During this transition, diamonds were discovered, most likely by British 
colonizers. The commercial diamond market in Sierra Leone began in 1931. Various 
private companies such as the Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST) and De 
Beers, one of the largest diamond companies in the world at the time (and today), headed 
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the “operation.”155 During this time, British colonial powers gave exclusive rights to the 
mines to a section of CAST, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust Ltd (SLST), for 99 years.156 
In 1937, six years after the beginning of the commercial diamond trade, Sierra Leone was 
mining over one million carats worth of diamonds.157 While the country’s mines were 
under direct control of the SLST and Africans had little to no mineral rights, as many as 
75,000 illegal miners emerged by the mid-1950s. During this period, known as the “Great 
Diamond Rush,” rice, one of Sierra Leone’s major exports, became an import of the 
country because so many men had abandoned the rice fields to search for diamonds and 
also because of the colonial economic policy.158 
Prior to the discovery of diamonds in 1930, the country’s main economic sectors 
were agricultural (almost half of the country’s two million people were employed as cash 
crop farmers producing palm oil, ginger, and palm kernels).159 As Lansana Gberie details, 
“…Diamonds soon came to dominate the economy, alone accounting for three-fifths of 
the country’s export earnings by the time of independence. So Sierra Leone’s economy, 
like almost all colonial economies, was a wholly extractive one, producing raw materials 
for the metropolitan economy in Europe.”160 
Because so much of the production in Sierra Leone was for export, the colony 
was barely able to sustain itself, and the consequences include what many scholars such 
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as Walter Rodney label “underdevelopment.”161 Underdevelopment most often occurs 
when a country’s economy is centered around the production of goods for export, and 
thus becomes dependent on other countries to import everything else. Because these 
export-dependent economies produce mostly simple and cheap goods to sell to other 
countries, they are unable to earn enough to sustain their own country, and many 
characterize this as a form of exploitation.162 In addition, this underdevelopment in Sierra 
Leone helped cultivate a class of opportunistic colonial officials, and after independence 
many politicians and prime ministers continued to blur the line between good governance 
and corruption.163 
Inhabitants of Sierra Leone were not passive participants in the oppression that 
they endured, however. “Anticolonial sentiment” and protest of British control began 
near the beginning of the colonial period in 1787 and lasted until independence.164 
Protests against British taxation, especially the Hut Tax, was one of the biggest 
objections that the Africans had and would often revolt along trade routes, Christian 
missions, and construction areas where railroads were being built.165 This anticolonial 
sentiment would eventually grow where formal political parties would begin to emerge. 
After decades of colonial rule, powerful political parties surfaced in Sierra Leone, 
including the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP), which eventually pushed for 
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protectorate majority control through the 1951 constitution.166 The leader of that party, Dr. 
Milton Margai, was elected prime minister in 1957, although at that time, women and 
men that did not own property were unable to vote.167 While some local political 
positions were allocated to the people of Sierra Leone during this time, the colony did not 
receive independence until April 1961.168 During his time as prime minister, Margai 
attempted to unite the country as one, although he changed few policies that the British 
installed during the colonial period, and ultimately died in 1964. After Margai’s death, 
his brother Albert assumed power and “…The pattern of corrupt politics began and 
accelerated…[and] By all accounts saw the state not as a stewardship in the public 
interest but as the power base for personal gain and aggrandizement.”169 While Milton 
did not necessarily use a patronage system, Albert did and the SLPP transitioned into 
more of an ethnic party, attracting mostly members of the Mende group (one of the 
largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone).170 
During the time Albert was in power, ironworker and trade unionist Siaka Stevens 
gained support from the other majority group in Sierra Leone, the Temnes, as well as the 
Limba, Loko, Mandingo, and the Susu.171 Initially, Stevens was made Minister of Mines 
under Milton Margai but lost his parliamentary seat, denounced the SLPP and formed the 
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often violent, All People’s Congress (APC) in 1960.172 After being arrested and jailed, 
Stevens ran in the general election of 1967 after Margai’s death but was not sworn in as 
the new prime minister due to his arrest by Margai protégé, Brigadier David Lansana.173 
A coup was staged against Lansana and a temporary government, the National 
Reformation Council (NRC), was established.174 Because the APC had won more seats in 
the general election of 1967, they were handed power by the NRC and Stevens was 
installed as prime minister in 1968.175 After being instated into power, Stevens ordered 
Lansana’s execution in “…One of the first official state killings in Sierra Leone since the 
colonial authorities hanged over eighty anti-colonial rebels in 1898.”176 The Stevens-
ordered execution of Lansana helped kick-start the state-sponsored violence that would 
haunt Sierra Leone for decades to come. 
Soon after, Stevens declared himself “executive president” in 1971. As John L. 
Hirsch states, Stevens entered into a multi-party political system installed by the British 
and by the time he left office seventeen years later, he was seen as a “master of 
manipulation” that had transformed Sierra Leone into a one-party state, eliminating all 
political opposition.177 Like many other dictatorial rulers, “Stevens created extra-legal 
institutions and channels which came to supersede the formal state institutions and fatally 
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undermined them.”178 Fearing the army, Stevens created the Internal Security Unit (ISU), 
a “shadow army,” that was comprised mostly of citizens from the poorer parts of 
Freetown and became known for its criminal interests.179 Both William Reno and Gberie 
agree that for Stevens, the diamond mines became the foundation for his patrimony and it 
became illicit and abusive.180 Stevens recognized the voting power that the illegal miners 
possessed and thus turned on the SLST by forming a government company, the National 
Diamond Mining Company (NDMC).181 The NDMC held twelve of 51 percent of shares, 
where more diamonds were being smuggled to neighboring Liberia than were actually 
being sold during that time.182 Subsequently, the diamond problem would become a much 
larger impediment decades later when they were being used to fuel both the civil wars in 
Sierra Leone and in neighboring Liberia. 
In 1985, Stevens resigned as president due to old age and handed over power to 
Major General and APC member Joseph Momoh.183 Throughout Stevens’ presidency, 
Momoh was fiercely loyal to the president and was ultimately chosen as his successor.184 
At the time that Momoh took office the country was virtually bankrupt, despite its 
mineral wealth.185 As Hirsch details, Stevens emptied the state treasury, started expensive 
projects such as extravagant hotels and apartment complexes, and took funds from 
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universities and put them into his own pocket.186 Momoh’s cabinet and policies remained 
virtually the same as Stevens’ and he too was taken out of office after seven years in 
power by a coup in 1992 due to the country’s bankruptcy and virtual collapse.187  
For these rulers, politics, winning elections, patronage, and personal gain was 
their focus, not economic and social affairs that would benefit society, and because of this, 
the country continued to suffer.188 The economy was in decline, leaving Sierra Leone as 
one of the poorest countries in Africa, where the country itself ranked the lowest on the 
United Nations Human Development Index out of 160 countries for 1991.189 For example, 
Sierra Leone had one of the world’s worst life expectancy rates, literacy rates, and access 
to health services, safe water, and sanitation.190 In addition, the majority of the population 
in Sierra Leone was considered rural (69 percent), where less than ten percent of the rural 
population had access to clean water and health services. Because of this, the disparity 
between the urban and rural population of Sierra Leone was one of the worst in the world 
as well.191 
 
CIVIL WAR: LIBERIA 
 
 The First Liberian Civil War officially began on Christmas Eve of 1989 when 
Taylor and the NPFL attacked Nimba County from neighboring Ivory Coast, killing 
mostly government officials and soldiers at the onset. At times, the NPFL would spare 
certain ethnic groups whereas in other instances they would kill indiscriminately. 
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However, they especially targeted those having real or perceived ties to the Doe regime. 
Because Doe promoted patronage based on his own ethnic group, the Krahn, Taylor (an 
ethnic Americo-Liberian and Gola) would primarily target the Krahn, but also had no 
hesitation to kill or capture others.192 Similar to the way in which the RUF was initially 
dismissed in Sierra Leone, so too was Taylor and the NPFL; however, the single goal of 
ousting Doe from power soon became a civil war that would last for years to come, even 
after Doe was out of power.193  
 After fighting had reached the capital city of Monrovia in July of 1990, the West 
African fighting force, ECOMOG, intervened in an attempt to quell the violence, in 
hopes that the entire region would not become destabilized.194 However, the force was 
accused of widespread theft and looting and was unable to stop the NPFL. At this time, 
Taylor and the NPFL controlled over 90 percent of the country, and it was necessary to 
establish a ceasefire.195 As a result, a new peace accord was negotiated. The 
Yamoussoukro IV Accord was negotiated under the leadership of Ivory Coast’s then-
President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny.196 The accord was signed in October of 1991 and 
reiterated most of the terms of previous accords including: a ceasefire, a elections within 
six months, the disarmament of ECOMOG, and a “buffer zone” across the Sierra 
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Leonean-Liberian border (to avoid more spillover into Sierra Leone).197 Because of the 
accord, the fighting was able to be diverted from Monrovia, but Taylor continued the 
fighting in the rural areas.198 
 The end of the Yamoussoukro Peace Accord came in October of 1992 after a 
surprise attack on Monrovia by Taylor and the NPFL, coined “Operation Octopus.”199 
The operation lasted through October and November and created an enormous surge of 
violence in the capital and massively affected the civilian population. ECOMOG was 
able to push the NPFL from the city because of bombing raids.200 Following the attack on 
Monrovia, another round of peace talks began. In July 1993, the Cotonou Accord:  
…Provided for encampment, disarmament and demobilisation and laid down the 
procedures for the conduct of general elections. By this time, however, it was now 
clear that Taylor's decision to sign cease-fire agreements was not an expression of 
his sincere commitment to a negotiated solution. He took advantage of the lull in 
the fighting to re-arm and relaunch his attacks and negotiated only under intense 
military and diplomatic pressure.201 
In addition, the fighting had already spilled over into Sierra Leone, with Taylor’s help. 
Because he controlled almost 90 percent of Liberia’s territory, he was able to easily sell 
and smuggle goods such as diamonds, timber, and iron ore.202 With this, he aided Foday 
Sankoh and the RUF in exchange for diamonds.203 Both wars shared similar 
characteristics including casualties, refugees and displaced citizens, the annihilation of 
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both economic and governmental infrastructure, and the complete lack of rule of law, 
equaling complete state collapse.204  
 By 1994, all efforts to end the war remained inadequate. Because Taylor’s initial 
goal was to oust Doe from power, ending the war was the next step for Taylor. 
Essentially, the parties were willing to participate in the peace talks in hopes of being part 
of the power-sharing measures that were being negotiated.205 Because of the continued 
fighting, the UN and other peacekeeping forces had threatened to leave the country if 
there were not efforts to end the fighting. These threats led to the signing of the Abuja 
Accord in Nigeria by all leaders of the warring factions.206 However, elections that were 
supposed to take place in November 1995 were postponed because of discrepancies and 
fighting, and the conflict continued.207 By this time, it is estimated that over 200,000 
people had died in the conflict, half of the population was displaced, and six prominent 
groups were fighting within the country.208  
 One condition of the Abuja Accord included elections that were to take place in 
July of 1997. By this time, Taylor had made the NPFL into a political party, the National 
Patriotic Party (NPP), and gained the majority in the parliament. Taylor was voted 
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president in the 1997 elections.209 In regards to the elections, Quentin Outram states, 
“That the head of a warring faction, credibly accused of fighting a war that became 'near 
genocidal' in 1990, and of numerous serious human rights abuses since, should have been 
overwhelmingly elected to the presidency surprised many outside observers.”210 To 
secure his win in the election, Taylor used rhetoric emphasizing human rights, good 
governance, national reconciliation, and economic renovation in his campaign; however, 
Taylor continued his exploitation of the country’s resources.211 Taylor knew that the 
country was economically, politically, and socially broke. He understood that by tugging 
at the “heartstrings” of those affected most by the war and that using progressive rhetoric 
would help him gain a certain amount of legitimacy. However, Taylor’s victory was 
mostly attributed to the fear of returning to war if he had lost, and the extortion of the 
Liberian people, although the elections were observed as free and fair.212 
 In addition to the six groups mentioned, a new rebel group had emerged in Liberia 
by 2000, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). LURD was 
created with the single goal of ousting Taylor from power and was led by politician, rebel 
leader, and Taylor opponent Sekou Conneh.213 Interestingly, “Both LURD and Charles 
Taylor recruited heavily from among Sierra Leonean ex-combatants, some of whom had 
just finished the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR) Program in 
Sierra Leone, a process meant to ensure that these fighters did not return to the bush.”214  
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 Furthermore, a second rebel group had also emerged, the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), with the similar goal of ousting Taylor from power. All 
parties to the conflict used child soldiers and committed numerous war crimes.215 Both of 
these groups were formed in similar fashion to the way that the NPFL was formed: out of 
hostility against the sitting president.216 Once formed, the groups, particularly LURD, 
began carrying out small-scale attacks in various rural villages, using the same “hit-and-
run” strategy as the RUF in Sierra Leone.217 Afterward, LURD launched an attack on 
Monrovia in June of 2003 and remained in the capital until ECOWAS peacekeepers 
arrived.218  
 Once ECOWAS peacekeepers arrived to intervene and quash the fighting, the 
Accra Agreement was authorized after all parties, including LURD, MODEL, and Taylor, 
agreed to sign. As part of the Accra Agreement of 2003, all perpetrators were granted 
amnesty and in August of that year, Taylor left for Nigeria following an asylum offer.219 
Taylor accepted the offer and stepped down as president because during this time, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) issued an indictment for Taylor that included 
charges such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.220 Taylor most likely agreed to 
sign because he knew he could not stay in power following the SCSL indictment, and 
instead accepted the asylum offer, thinking he could live in Nigeria versus the alternative: 
stand trial in Sierra Leone. Taylor spent the next three years in Nigeria and was 
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transferred to the SCSL in March of 2006.221 Following the departure of Taylor, an 
interim government (the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL)) was 
established and inaugurated on October 14, 2003.222 The creation of the NTGL, the exit 
of Taylor, and the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 
marked the end of the fourteen year civil war in Liberia.  
 Soon after the initiation of the peace agreement, elections took place in October 
2005 and Africa’s first female president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, was elected.223 In the 
election, Johnson-Sirleaf, an Americo-Liberian, faced former footballer, George Weah, 
an ethnic Kru. Because neither candidate received over 50 percent of the vote, they 
engaged in a run-off election.224 Both candidates attracted various groups of voters. 
Because Weah was a celebrity and not a career politician, many young people, as well as 
ethnic Kru, were enthusiastic to vote for him. Johnson-Sirleaf was a Harvard graduate 
and had previously worked for the World Bank, and was also a political activist for over 
30 years. She worked as the Assistant Minister of Finance in the Tolbert administration 
and after he was assassinated, she briefly worked in the Doe administration as President 
of the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, but left after publicly criticizing 
Doe.225 After this criticism, Johnson-Sirleaf was convicted to ten years in prison and after 
serving a partial sentence, she returned to the U.S. She returned to Liberia when she 
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began work as an economist for the World Bank and CitiBank. After unsuccessfully 
running for president against Charles Taylor in 1997, she found herself running for the 
presidency once again in 2005.226 
 Many reasons were attributed to Johnson-Sirleaf’s eventual victory. Because of 
his lack of education, Weah was often attacked for his suggested inability to lead the 
country, if elected.227 In regards to the election, David Fickling writes, “More than half of 
Liberia's registered voters are women, and analysts said Ms. Johnson-Sirleaf's gender 
may have played a key role in attracting support from people tired of the confrontational 
and headstrong style of the men who have ruled Liberia since its founding in 1847.”228  
After the run-off election, Johnson-Sirleaf was victorious.229 Expectedly, the 
results were controversial, as Weah and his supporters claimed there were voting 
irregularities and an electoral commission looked into the allegations. International 
onlookers declared that the elections were free and fair and the electoral commission in 
Liberia officially confirmed her presidential victory after the close of the elections.230 Her 
inauguration was most notably supported by the U.S. and her inauguration ceremony was 
attended by notable figures such as First Lady Laura Bush and Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice.231  
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 Although elections took place, the needs of the country continued to be 
substantial. After the war, Liberia was not only one of the poorest countries in Africa, but 
one of the poorest in the world.232 Following Johnson-Sirleaf’s election, Liberians 
seemed genuinely optimistic that peace and security could be reached and that a 
democratic transition could be achieved. When the new president entered office, she 
initiated free education through sixth grade, a new, comprehensive rape law, and was able 
to write-off nearly five billion dollars of foreign debt. The democratic transition, however, 
has not been completely progressive. Because many of Taylor’s former advisors and 
supporters remained in positions within the government, claims of corruption have arose 
and basic services, such as electricity, have been difficult to obtain.233  
 The presidency of Johnson-Sirleaf, as well as the establishment of the Liberian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2008 will be examined in further detail in 
Chapters 3 and 4. In regards to Taylor, he became the first African head of state to be 
indicted for war crimes when his trial began in June 2009.234 Taylor was not directly 
arrested; he spent three years in exile in neighboring Nigeria until he was transferred to 
Freetown and given to the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).235 Although he 
was initially given amnesty by earlier peace agreements, the crimes he committed were 
against international law and therefore he was able to be charged by an international body. 
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His charges included 11 counts of war crimes and other crimes against humanity.236 As 
recently as February 1, 2012, Taylor’s defense requested to reopen his defense but was 
denied on February 10, 2012.237 It was announced on May 30, 2012 that Taylor would 
serve 50 years for his charges; however, an appeal is expected to be filed. In regards to 
the verdict and subsequent sentence of Taylor, Marlise Simons of The New York Times 
writes, “In what was viewed as a watershed case for modern human rights law, Mr. 
Taylor was the first former head of state convicted by an international tribunal since the 
Nuremberg trials in Germany after World War II.”238 
 While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) will be discussed further 
in Chapters 3 and 4, it is important to disclose their findings about the conflict. The  
TRC’s final report, released on July 1, 2009, recorded violations that occurred from 
January 1979 to October 2003. The TRC identified 169,676 violations, with the highest 
number of violations being reported in 1990, then in 2003, and 1994.239 The TRC 
recorded 23 different types of violations, including forced displacement, killings, assault, 
abduction, forced labor, torture, forced recruitment, mutilation, rape, gang rape, sexual 
slavery, and multiple rape.240 The NPFL rebels and LURD troops comprised the highest 
number of registered perpetrators, with forced displacement representing almost one third 
of the violations. Rape and other forms of sexual violence recorded 0.6 percent to 1.5 
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percent of all violations.241 Rape and other forms of sexual violence will be discussed and 
examined further in Chapter 3.  
 
CIVIL WAR: SIERRA LEONE 
 
Given its colonial and post-colonial history, all of the conditions necessary for a 
civil war were present in Sierra Leone. These circumstances included societal dissent 
over the political and economic situations and extreme poverty and disparity between the 
ruling class and the general population. The war in Sierra Leone can be divided into three 
phases: 1) conventional “target” warfare (1991-November 1993); 2) “guerilla” warfare 
(1993-March 1997); and 3) power struggles and peace efforts (1997-present).242 The 
following section will describe each of these phases, as well as the consequences suffered 
by the Sierra Leonean population. 
Between 1987 and 1988, a group of Sierra Leonean men, including former Sierra 
Leonean army corporal Foday Saybanah Sankoh (an ethnic Temne from the Tonkolili 
district), travelled to Libya to receive insurgency training under the Muammar al-Gaddafi 
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regime.243 While in Libya, Sankoh met Liberia’s Charles Taylor and the two soon 
became allies. Gaddafi was able to give them training, money, and arms.244 Sankoh later 
founded the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the major rebel group responsible for the 
eleven year civil war in Sierra Leone. The RUF claimed its aims were to “…Overthrow 
Sierra Leone’s ‘corrupt’ rulers, ‘liberate’ the country’s derelict peasantry and the 
dispossessed, and institute ‘genuine democracy.’”245 Soon, the RUF’s goals were 
overshadowed by the war and its atrocities. Prior to the invasion of Sierra Leone, many 
RUF members were recruited by coercion but others joined, mostly young men, because 
of grievances with the Momoh government.246 The group was generally formed out of 
desperation and the disparities caused by colonialism and continued under independent 
governments.247 
In early 1991, Sankoh led the RUF, with help of Taylor, into Sierra Leone. 
Because of their history together in Libya, Taylor provided aid in the form of weapons 
and ammunition and also soldiers in exchange for gems, later labeled as “blood diamonds” 
or “conflict diamonds.”248 Since the diamond rush of the 1950s when diamonds were 
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being smuggled out of Sierra Leone and in to Liberia, Liberia has been a problem for the 
governments of Sierra Leone, especially in playing the role of mentor for the RUF.249 
After its formation in 1991, the RUF first began its attacks in the Kailahun 
District along the eastern border of Liberia, and the fighting quickly spread to other areas 
including the Pujehun, Kono, Kambia, Moyamba, Bo, and Tonkolili districts. These 
districts were located throughout the country and many were populated mostly by the 
Mende ethnic group, as well as the Temne in the Tonkolili and Kambia district. 
Government troops soon began a counter-attack. Despite their attempts to defend the area, 
the Kailahun District fell to the RUF within a month.250 After taking an area, the rebels 
focused on terrorizing civilians in attempts to show how the country’s army could not 
protect its citizens.251 According to Alfred Zack-Williams, by early 2002 over 10,000 
people had been killed by the RUF while close to one million citizens were either 
displaced in refugee camps or across enemy lines.252  
In addition, much of the money being spent to combat the RUF was not being 
allocated to the soldiers but was instead being stolen by senior officers. Consequently, a 
faction of soldiers formed a junta and ousted Momoh from power.253 Captain Valentine 
Strasser (of Creole descent), assumed the role of the country’s new leader and established 
the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), made up of members of the military 
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junta, through which he promised to end the war and repair the country. Similar to 
Sankoh and the RUF, Strasser and his advisors, mostly men from the national army, 
lacked a cohesive ideology. Their initial goal was to oust Momoh from power and from 
there, their political ideology was not a cohesive one. Initially, Strasser received financial 
support from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of their 
commitment to a “transparent administration.”254 As part of their commitment, thirty of 
Momoh’s officials were charged with abuse of office and were placed on house arrest, 
only later to be executed.255 Initially, citizens of Sierra Leone welcomed Strasser and the 
NPRC because of the former corrupt Momoh government; however, the NPRC 
suspended the Constitution and endorsed a “rule-by-decree”256 program as the war 
continued to intensify.257 
During this time in 1992, the RUF became more destructive and damaging.258 
RUF leaders were recruiting members of the SLA regarded as “sobels” (soldiers also 
working with the rebels). These sobels were frustrated with their positions and found it 
easier to work with the rebels, than against them.259 They were used to loot and gain 
intelligence and weapons.260 During the RUF’s tactics, Strasser was engaged in his own 
recruitment drive for the national army and it resulted in the reliance on unskilled and 
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undisciplined soldiers, sometimes as young as seven years old.261 Meanwhile, the RUF 
continued seizing the country’s diamond mines, mainly positioned in the eastern portion 
of the country, and in June 1992, the RUF seized the country’s main diamond center, 
Koidu, located in the eastern Kono district.262 Following a back and forth between the 
RUF and the SLA over the diamond center and other fighting, a unilateral ceasefire was 
announced in December of 1993, by Strasser.263 There is speculation as to why Strasser 
declared a ceasefire at this time, as the RUF was not completely defeated. The Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that he most likely wanted to gain 
international recognition as being a successful leader and bringing the war to an end. 
Regardless, the RUF used this time as a chance to regroup and try new tactics, discussed 
below, and ultimately restarted the war. Regardless of Strasser’s motives, the ceasefire of 
1993, lasting until early 1994, marked the end of the first phase of the conflict.264 
Following the ceasefire of 1993, the second phase of the civil war, lasting until 
1997, was initiated after the RUF was able to regroup. At this time, the RUF became a 
“guerilla” movement and spread into smaller units into the forest in attempts to avoid 
defeat.265 The RUF then set up checkpoints along the highways, looted and burned towns 
and villages and also took various hostages.266 Prior to this phase of the conflict, the RUF 
had specific targets that were fueling their attacks, such as government officials and the 
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national military; however, this phase ushered in more sporadic attacks with few 
calculated targets, categorizing it as guerilla warfare.267 
 During this time, the war continued to escalate and in 1995, the country’s army 
hired a South African security force, Executive Outcomes (EO).268 EO, mercenaries 
whom had been members of the apartheid government military, soon began retaking key 
diamond areas and territories because of their air capability and skills.269 They were able 
to use monitoring technology to trace the RUF’s movements and were able to use 
helicopters to execute raids.270 This added help brought the RUF to a standstill. 
Meanwhile, Strasser was under pressure from the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS)271 and international donors, including the British, to hold elections. 
While Sierra Leone had been receiving aid during the war, it was conditional under the 
circumstances that the country return to civilian rule as soon as possible.272 
The above conditions ushered in elections in 1996 and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, 
leader of the SLPP, was elected president.273 While the SLPP was traditionally a party 
driven by the Mende group, Kabbah was a Mandingo from the Kailahun District, which 
had traditionally aligned with the APC.274 Prior to being elected president, Kabbah had 
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been a district commissioner and held a high position within the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, and also joined the United Nations Development Programme as deputy chief.275  
Given the short amount of time to organize the elections, it is notable that they 
were recognized by international observers as relatively free and fair.276 After the 
elections, Kabbah became the first Muslim to be inaugurated president of Sierra Leone 
and also the first leader of the country to belong to the Mandingo ethnic group.277 The 
new president attempted to reconstruct, reconcile, and rehabilitate the country by ending 
the war, professionalizing the armed forces, and combatting corruption.278 In attempts to 
increase security and quash the violence, Kabbah used the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), a 
force created to combat RUF attacks in rural areas.279 As stated by the International 
League for Human Rights, “The CDF was commonly referred to as the Kamajors (a 
Mende term for “local hunters”) because it recruited local farmers who were familiar 
with the countryside and could more successfully maintain its security.”280 In addition to 
increased security, Kabbah tried to make peace with the RUF in hopes of ending the war. 
Kabbah and Sankoh subsequently signed the Abidjan Peace Accord in November 
1996.281 The peace accord called for an amnesty for all soldiers, for the RUF to give up 
arms and transition into a political party, and for the withdrawal of EO mercenaries.282  
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The election of Kabbah and the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord helped usher 
in the third and final official phase of the conflict. According to the Sierra Leone Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, this period is best understood as a power struggle stage 
marked by random fighting, coups, and regime changes.283 At the start of this phase, in 
May 1997, a coup ensued, in which Major Johnny Paul Koroma and his Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC; mostly made up of ex-SLA members) assumed power. 
Koroma cited various reasons for the coup, including the cutback of the army by Kabbah 
and the failure to implement the peace agreement.284 As described by Ndumbe, “The 
1997 coup led to a total breakdown in the institutions, structures, and operation of 
government. Conspiracy and force replaced the rule of law, and serious human rights 
violations by the RUF and government forces were pervasive.”285 After the coup, Kabbah 
went into exile in Nigeria, but was not completely ousted from power. While in Nigeria, 
he began the necessary plans to reinstate himself. With the help of the Economic 
Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and their 
increased military presence in the country, Kabbah was restored to power as president in 
March 1998 (he continued to serve until 2007).286 
Throughout this period, the UN attempted to resolve the conflict by sending 
envoys to the country, as well as instituting arms and oil embargos.287 In July of 1998, the 
UN Security Council created the UN Observers Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), 
initially allowing 70 military observers access to the country. Many countries sent 
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uniformed officials to aid in the process.288 The mission was specifically designed to 
disarm and demobilize combatants and also train the national police force but 
unfortunately, the fighting continued.289 The rebels once again invaded Freetown where it 
is estimated that over 7,000 people were killed in a matter of three weeks and tens of 
thousands of people were injured, dismembered, abducted, or sexually assaulted.290 
Because of the continued fighting, UNOMSIL’s original six month mandate was 
extended into 1999. 
At this time, President Kabbah proposed a peace agreement, with help from the 
UN and ECOWAS.291 In July of 1999, Kabbah and Sankoh traveled to Lomé, the capital 
of Togo, and established the Lomé Peace Accord.292 As detailed by Dennis Bright, “The 
Lomé Agreement was intended to be a plan of action. It proposed a schedule for the 
cessation of hostilities and a series of measures related to governance, political, 
humanitarian, socio-economic as well as military and security issues. These were to be 
implemented by a range of institutions established under the agreement.”293 The Lomé 
Agreement granted blanket amnesty to all parties and combatants involved and members 
of the RUF were given positions in the transitional government, with Sankoh acquiring 
the vice presidency. The agreement was signed by all major parties involved, including 
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President Kabbah and Sankoh. The agreement was eventually supported by ECOWAS, 
the OAU, the UN and various West African states.294  
One of the most controversial elements of the peace agreement was the blanket 
amnesty that was given to all perpetrators. Initially, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the rest of the human rights community objected to 
this because of the problems associated with impunity, it was believed that it would be 
impediment to establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission if perpetrators were 
not able to be prosecuted.295 After this issue was raised, the agreement specifically left 
out “…Acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law” so that perpetrators could be prosecuted 
later by the United Nations or other international tribunals, to be discussed later.296 In 
addition, Western influence has also come under fire concerning the peace agreement, as 
“peace on the cheap.” While initially having little interest in the conflict, it has been 
hypothesized that international advisors “…Simply did not understand the rebels or the 
war, and that they strong-armed Tejan Kabbah into signing the agreement.”297 
Also during this time in 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1270, 
expanding the UNOMSIL mandate into a new peacekeeping mission named the United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).298 Unlike the previous mission, 
UNAMSIL significantly increased the number of military and police personnel and 
military observers. At the height of the mission, there were over 17,000 military 
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personnel and 87 UN police officers.299 The peacekeeping mission helped and assisted 
members of the Sierra Leonean government disarm fighters, hold elections, and helped to 
restore government infrastructure.300  
Although all combatants were given full amnesty, RUF soldiers continued to 
violate the orders of the peace accord and ceasefire by refusing to disarm and demobilize, 
partly because they wanted to retain in control of various diamond mines.301 While 
Sankoh appeared to accept the terms of the peace agreement, Sam Bockarie (second-in-
command for the RUF), removed himself from the RUF and would not accept the 
conditions.302 Further violations occurred in May 2000 when RUF soldiers captured 
around 500 peacekeeping troops (who were later released).303 Following this attack, 
thousands of protestors were demonstrating outside of Vice President Sankoh’s 
compound when RUF guards shot into the crowd, killing 16 people.304 Consequently, 
Sankoh was handed over to the UN and taken to a secret location, for fear of his safety 
because of the hostile crowd outside.305 Issa Sesay was installed as the interim RUF 
commander and the disarmament proceeded when in 2002, President Kabbah declared 
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the war was finally over.306 As stated by Gberie, “By January 2002 72,490 combatants, 
both RUF and CDF, had been disarmed and a total of 42,000 weapons and 1.2 million 
rounds of ammunition collected.”307 This is largely viewed as a success given that just 
three years prior in December 1999, less than 10,000 combatants had been disarmed at 
demobilization centers (mostly from the SLA).308 
Over the course of the war and after, countless authors such as Human Rights 
Watch, David Keen, Peter Penfold, and Gberie have studied the causes and consequences 
of the conflict. What these authors recognize is the central role that diamond mining 
played in the endurance of the war. According to a report by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the 
diamonds in Sierra Leone helped to facilitate, but did not cause the war. The wrecked 
economy and social inequality were the root causes. In 1999, towards the end of the war, 
almost $70 million worth of diamond exports had been smuggled, mostly into 
neighboring Liberia (the exact percentage is unknown).309  
 Other analysts point to different but related causes of war. Corruption and bad 
governance were found to be the main contributors to the violence, where after 
independence, “Instead of implementing positive and progressive policies, each regime 
perpetuated the ills and self-serving machinations left behind by its predecessor.”310 
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Because of the bad governance and corruption, not much was needed to provoke the 
conflict in Sierra Leone and the RUF provided the catalyst.311  
 By all accounts, the RUF did not have a distinct political ideology. At the onset of 
the conflict, leaders of the rebel group claimed its goals were to overthrow the corrupt 
government of Sierra Leone and install democracy; however, the majority of deaths and 
human rights abuses were among civilians. Furthermore, even after many RUF members 
were given positions within the government, rebels continued to violate terms of all of 
the peace agreements, and instead displayed that the RUF wanted to rule the country, not 
bring peace to it. Because many members of the RUF were considered marginalized by 
society, as described above, they were willing to take drastic measures to ensure 
power.312 These ills allowed the war to continue for over a decade, resulting in the deaths 
of  tens of thousands. Thousands more were abused, tortured, amputated and sexually 
assaulted. Despite the mineral wealth of the country, by the end of the war Sierra Leone 
was one of the poorest countries in the world.313 
 Because of the wide-scale brutality and destruction of the war, a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and Special Court were established (to be discussed in a later 
chapter) to evaluate the war and bring the largest perpetrators to justice. In addition to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court, elections were held soon after 
the end of the war in May 2002, when President Kabbah was elected to a second term.314 
Although the RUF had been converted into a political party, the Revolutionary United 
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Front Party (RUFP), it did not receive any seats in parliament.315 The Carter Center and 
UN representatives observed the election, and very few violations were reported, and the 
election was seen as a success for Sierra Leone.316 President Kabbah continued to serve 
until 2007 when Ernest Bai Koroma, member of the APC, was elected in a run-off 
election determined again to be free and fair, where half of the country’s five million 
citizens were registered to vote.317 The country of Sierra Leone continues to struggle 
today in almost all areas of society, but the conditions have undoubtedly improved from 
the conditions present during the eleven year civil war. The post-conflict and current 
political situations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
To summarize, the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia include both similarities 
and differences. Both countries shared a colonial history that propelled the class and 
ethnic divides in society, and both had dictatorships propped up by the West until the end 
of the Cold War, when these wars began. Most scholars agree that the conflicts were 
driven mostly by ethnic tension, power politics, and a struggle over resources. The 
conflict in Sierra Leone, however, was brought to a head by the spillover from Liberia 
and the lucrative diamond trade. In regards to the conflict, author Morten Bøås writes:  
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…The most basic reasons for these two wars are to be found in the extreme 
version of neopatrimonial politics that was developed in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Neopatrimonialism is not unique to these two countries, nor to Africa. However; 
the historical experience of the two countries suggests that Liberia and Sierra 
Leone developed an extreme version of neopatrimonial politics built on the need 
to secure the self through self-categorisation into self and other…Neither country 
is likely to achieve sustainable peace if warlike conditions still exist in the other 
country.318 
Because the spillover from Liberia helped drive the conflict in Sierra Leone, one cannot 
say for sure whether the war in Sierra Leone would have happened or not, if not for the 
conflict in Liberia. Most specifically for this study, both countries experienced high 
levels of human rights abuses and sexual violence during and after the war, where in 
Liberia it was estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of the population was sexually 
abused or raped and in Sierra Leone it was assessed that as many as 250,000 females 
were raped over the course the war.319  
 In seeking to identify what factors are correlated with the continuance of 
widespread acts of wartime rape even after the cessation of official conflict, it will be 
important to see if having a female head of state, makes any difference in terms of the 
sexual violence that occurs after the war was over. This difference is crucial in testing the 
hypothesis that governments with high levels of female representation will be associated 
with lower levels of impunity for sexual assault and this will result in lower levels of 
sexual violence. It is to these questions that we turn in Chapter 4. 
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PRE-WAR STATUS OF WOMEN: LIBERIA 
 Because Liberian women experienced extremely high levels of war crimes, sexual 
violence and assault during the war and after, it is important to understand women’s 
position within the country before the war.320 Their subordination and the discrimination 
that women in Liberia faced prior to the conflict may help explain why they experienced 
such high levels of abuses during the war and after. Like most other societies around the 
world, society across Liberia is patrilineal (based on the male blood line) and in most 
cultures male dominance has been the common ideology, in which women are mostly 
assigned to the private sphere.321 The following information is important to present 
because it offers a small glimpse into the period prior to the war and provides a 
contextual understanding into some aspects of Liberian society during that time. 
 Also, women comprised only 30 percent of the workforce in 1988, despite making 
up half of the country’s population.322 Contrary to other aspects of women’s lives, their 
labor was considered very valuable. The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
points out, “…The sexual division of labor in indigenous agriculture afforded women a 
measure of power, if not formal authority. Women’s labor was extremely valuable, as 
seen in the institution of bride-wealth that accompanied marriage.”323 While there were 
divisions of labor that negatively affected women, for example, Americo-Liberian 
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women were relegated to the private sphere and often did not work outside the home, 
however, for indigenous women, they held power in the agriculture sector, and were 
esteemed as agriculturalists.324 
 For over a century society has been stratified according to social class, ethnicity, 
and differences between genders. The “settlers” and the Americo-Liberian women were 
often those afforded the ability to own property, and were treated as a higher class, while 
poor “settler” women and indigenous women were afforded few rights and existed at the 
bottom rungs of society. Even when they had rights by law, they were unable to enjoy 
these rights in practice. For example, women were given the right to vote in 1946, 
however, women were only allowed to vote if they owned property and very few women 
actually did. In Liberia, there was a system of laws, the Hinterland Laws, which 
“…Denied women certain basic rights such as owning property, holding major 
discussions with men, participating in decision making processes, and doing certain jobs 
despite being able to do them like working in a mine or driving a vehicle.”325 The same 
rules applied for men as well. It was not until the 1950s when this requirement was 
changed and all Liberians were able to participate in the political process.326  
 According to the UNDP, just before the war, in the 1980’s, the average life 
expectancy for both men and women in Liberia was 55 years of age in 1987 with 39 
percent of the population having access to health services and only 55 percent having 
access to clean water.327 Liberia had one of the world’s highest maternal mortality rates 
with 1,100 deaths per 100,000 live births, with only Sierra Leone, Laos, Mali, Niger, 
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Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Burundi, and Afghanistan having higher rates. In addition 
to high maternal mortality rates, Liberia also struggled with high infant mortality rates. 
The Liberian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) found that in 1986 one in five 
children in Liberia died before their fifth birthday.328 The infant mortality rate was 44 
deaths per 1,000 live births, with high-risk pregnancies and lack of maternity care listed 
as leading causes of death.329 Part of high maternal mortality rates is likely due to the fact 
that the practice of abortion was (and is) highly restricted in Liberia where it is illegal 
unless the woman or fetus is at risk.330 
 In the period prior to the war Liberian women had few basic rights and access to 
few privileges independent of the men in their lives. Females had little access to 
education and therefore had low literacy rates, very few property rights, and they faced 
discrimination in other legal and social aspects of their lives as well. For example, in 
1985, 47 percent of males were literate, compared to 23 percent of females.331 In regards 
to primary school, males had a higher attendance rate, similar to Sierra Leone and other 
developing countries around the world during this time. For every 82 men enrolled in 
primary school, there were only 50 females.332 Furthermore, women had no legal right to 
their children if they divorced or if their spouse died, and while the law prohibited the act 
of polygamy, 30 percent of the female population lived in a polygamous marriage prior to 
the conflict.333 According to the UNDP, these inequalities “…Could be said to have laid 
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the foundation for the extreme violations perpetrated against women during wartime 
because men had already been socialized to violate women with impunity.”334  
 One would hardly predict a woman to be elected president of Liberia, given its 
historic gender relations. However, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected president of Liberia 
in 2005 and again in 2011. In Chapter 4, Liberian women’s lives immediately after the 
war will be discussed in more detail, as will their current status. 
 
PRE-WAR STATUS OF WOMEN: SIERRA LEONE 
 
 Up to this point, the goal has been to summarize the history of Sierra Leone, 
centered on the civil war that took place from 1991-2002. Very little focus has been 
placed on women’s experience versus men’s experience within the country. Like most 
countries around the world, the men and women of Sierra Leone no doubt have distinct 
experiences, before, during, and after the war. In order to establish a more detailed 
background to the sexual violence that took place during the war and after, a pre-war 
status of women report will attempt to provide a glimpse into the lives of the women 
living in the country.  
 Although most women did not receive an education and were unable to participate 
in politics, some women did hold traditional forms of power. Prior to colonization, Sierra 
Leone had a long history of women becoming paramount chiefs, especially Mende and 
Sherbro women. However many of Sierra Leone’s indigenous leaders lost their power 
under colonialism.335 As author Filomena Chioma Steady explains, “The participation of 
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traditional rulers in parliamentary deliberations and in the electoral process was crucial in 
legislation, in formulating policies, and in getting out the vote in their constituencies.”336 
 Prior to the war both culture and tradition prevented rural and urban women from 
obtaining education and women were often relinquished to the sidelines in terms of work 
and politics.337 In addition, women did not enjoy the same legal status as men, even 
though the 1991 constitution granted equal rights to everyone, women were first 
subordinate to their fathers and remained subordinate when they were married. For 
example, women did the majority of the agricultural work necessary to sustain the family, 
yet by law were barred from owning land and property, and therefore lacked any 
economic power or means.338 
 The 1991 Sierra Leonean Constitution called for equal rights between men and 
women; however, legal and social discrimination against women existed, especially in 
the areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance.339 For example, “Customary law, which is 
largely unwritten and applies to the majority of the population, also discriminates against 
women, precluding them from enjoying equal status or rights with men.”340 This can be 
seen in the Family Code, which determined that men are primarily the head-of-household 
and must give their authorization for anyone in their family to marry before the age of 
21.341 In some systems of traditional law in Sierra Leone, the wife is part of the husband’s 
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property and upon his death she became “chattel” and part of the inheritance.342 In 
regards to property rights, women have rarely had the right to own property although they 
have historically been the largest group of agricultural workers.343 If, for instance, their 
husbands died, their land would be lost, contributing to their lack of economic power or 
rights to land ownership.344  
 In addition, women comprised 33.1 percent of the total workforce in 1988, despite 
women making up over half of the population.345 Similar to other places around the world, 
women in Sierra Leone during this time experienced many economic disadvantages. For 
example, according to the Sierra Leonean TRC:  
Women before the war constituted the majority of the rural labour force. They 
made vital contributions to the economy. They have always played a substantial 
role in the sustenance of the family. Women provided more than 60% of farm 
labour for food production, processing and distribution…It is indeed telling that 
while women were engaged in subsistence farming and provided the labour force 
for cash crop production, men had greater access to ownership and control of cash 
crop production.346  
In addition to comprising most of the rural labor force, women also constituted most of 
the traders. Between 1988 and 1989, women made up 69 percent of the country’s trading 
force, however, they did not accumulate any sort of economic power because of their lack 
of education, lack of access to credit, and lack of general skills.347 
 Just prior to the outbreak of war, in 1987 Sierra Leone had one of the world’s 
worst life expectancies at just 42 years of age, in addition to having one of the world’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,” 98. 
345 UNDP, “Human Development Report 1990,” 156. 
346 Ibid, 100. 
347 Ibid, 100. 
	  
74 
highest infant mortality rates (153 deaths per 1,000 live births).348 In regard to maternal 
mortality rates, Sierra Leone had one of the worst rates in the world in 1990, falling only 
behind Niger and Afghanistan.349 During this time, less than half of the population of 
Sierra Leone had access to health services due to the fact that it was either too expensive 
or simply unavailable in some rural areas.350 
 Furthermore, the British Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 is still law in 
Sierra Leone. Under this law, obtaining an abortion is punishable by imprisonment for 
both the physician as well as the consenting female.351 There have been few adjustments 
to the law; however, abortions were allowed in cases where the mother or the fetus was at 
risk.352 Although many of these laws are current, they were installed since the country’s 
independence and must be taken into account when considering the environment for 
women prior to 1991 (when the war began). 
 Prior to 1991, in terms of literacy, for Sierra Leone, the rates were much lower 
than the world average. In the late 1980s, female literacy rates were 21 percent compared 
to 38 percent for men.353 From 1986-1988, for every 68 males enrolled in primary school 
there were only 48 females, and for every 23 males enrolled in secondary school there 
were 11 females enrolled.354 According to the Sierra Leonean TRC, the high levels of 
illiteracy and lack of schooling that women and girls experienced in Sierra Leone have 
“…Implications at a political level, where women and women’s issues have generally 
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been relegated to the back burner. There has always been a great lack of awareness of the 
need for women to participate in issues affecting their lives, even among women 
themselves.”355 Because of these difficulties, there have been many impediments to 
women’s progress in regards to breaking down traditional barriers. 
 In regards to rape and other gender-based violence crimes prior to the conflict, 
Sierra Leonean women had little recourse to justice, regardless of ethnic group.356 These 
crimes were typically handled within the community and formal legal action was rarely 
taken. Different forms of retribution were taken including beating the perpetrator, paying 
a fine, forcing marriage between the perpetrator and victim, and performing purification 
rites. Community intervention only happened if a victim reported it and because of 
stigmatization and shame, and a “culture of silence” discouraged women and girls from 
coming forward.357 In addition, only the rape a virgin was generally considered a serious 
crime.358 
 Therefore, prior to the wars, women in Sierra Leone and Liberia experienced 
many levels of discrimination and were denied rights in many aspects of their lives. 
Colonial and sometimes traditional customs and laws reinforced their subordinated status 
having lost the traditional rights and protections some women enjoyed prior to 
colonialism. In the next chapter, we turn to the sexual violence that occurred during both 
the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflict. 
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III. WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE 
 
 This chapter will focus on the widespread sexual violence and rape that occurred 
over the course of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. As the UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights states, “Conflicts are 
increasingly affecting civil populations and systematic rape is often being used to 
humiliate civilians and military personnel, to destroy the society and diminish prospects 
for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The first victims of these crimes are women and 
girls.”359 While the research question asks what factors are correlated with the 
continuance of widespread acts of wartime rape even after the cessation of official 
conflict, it is important to review the atrocities committed during the war as a contextual 
foundation for understanding the sexual violence and rape that continued after.  
  
WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE: LIBERIA 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, wartime rape did not gain widespread international 
visibility until the 1990s in Bosnia and Rwanda, although it has occurred throughout 
much of history, and continues to be one of the least prosecuted war crimes around the 
world. The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) explains that while 
conflicts are changing, where civilians are the majority of casualties.360  
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The violence that women experienced specifically in Liberia was related to the 
inequality that they experienced prior to conflict where a report for the United Nations 
detailed “…The violence women experience during armed conflict ‘does not arise solely 
out of the conditions of war; it is directly related to the violence that exists in women’s 
lives during peacetime. Throughout the world, women experience violence because they 
are women, and often because they do not have the same rights or autonomy that men 
do.’”361 
 In 1998, during the first five years of the conflict, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) interviewed and surveyed 205 Liberian women and girls about their 
experiences during the war. Of the 205 women participating, 49 percent of those reported 
encountering at least one act of sexual violence, which included rape or attempted rape. 
As the AMA detailed, “Women who were accused of belonging to a particular ethnic 
group or fighting faction or who were forced to cook for a soldier or fighter were at 
increased risk for physical and sexual violence.”362 In addition, 14 percent of women 
experienced more than one act of sexual violence and 42 percent reported witnessing a 
rape or killing.363 While this study was conducted during the first five years of the civil 
war, its results are relevant to the years after, as it is reported that sexual violence levels 
remained the same or increased in the last years of the war.364 Another study conducted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 The Advocates for Human Rights, “A House with Two Rooms: Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Liberia Diaspora Project,” (2009): 228. 
362 Shana Swiss et al., “Violence Against Women During the Liberian Civil Conflict,” 625. 
363 Ibid, 627. 
364 Ibid, 627; One of the limitations that was reported by the authors of the study included the decision to 
only interview women in the capital, Monrovia. They acknowledge that levels of sexual assault in the rural 
areas were probably higher because of the lack of peacekeeping forces outside of Monrovia. 
	  
78 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that of displaced women (500,000), 
one-third (168,000) were raped during the war.365 
 In regards to sexual violence abuses, women and girls between 15-19 years old 
were the majority age group at risk.366 A study conducted by the WHO in 2005 found that 
the majority of those sexually assaulted in the sample (1,216 women and girls) were of 
the Bassa (22.2 percent), Mano (20.6 percent), Lorma (19.9 percent), and Krahn (19.7 
percent) ethnic groups.367 As mentioned earlier, prior to the war in Liberia, women of all 
ethnicities lived under patriarchal constraints. During conflict, these constraints 
intensified. For example, some men used their positions of power and authority over 
women and coerced them into having sexual relations. 368 
 Although women and girls were sexually assaulted or raped regardless of their 
ethnicity, the majority of registered crimes of sexual violence occurred within seven 
districts, spread throughout the country’s 15 districts: Montserrado, Bong, Nimba, Lofa, 
Bomi, Gbarpolu, and Grand Bassa, where the majority of fighting occurred.369 In addition, 
because there were so many various fighting factions in the country, every ethnic group 
was targeted in some way or another. For example, those belonging to the Mandingo 
were targeted by rebels, specifically the NPFL, for their association with the Samuel Doe 
administration or their wealth.370 The Mandingo, Krahn, Gio, and Mano, were hit 
particularly hard because of their real or perceived association with the Doe 
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administration. Others (the Kru, Sarpo, Lorma, and Bassa) also reported being targeted 
for human rights abuses.371 However, Advocates for Human Rights, a United States-
based NGO states, “Statement givers described perpetrators selecting civilians for torture 
based on very tenuous evidence of the victims’ affiliation with a targeted group, evidence 
that statements revealed was often incorrect. As a result, virtually no one was safe 
because the risk of being mistaken as the enemy of any combatant was so high.”372 
Therefore, anyone (male or female) was in danger of being identified as an enemy 
collaborator.  
 Women were often selected based on their real or perceived group status but also 
simply because they were women. For example, as the war intensified, so too did the 
sexual violence and rape that women experienced because of the fact that women are 
seen as the gatekeepers and symbols of their communities.373 Other evidence provided by 
Amnesty International shows that women and girls were targeted regardless of their 
ethnic background and were taken for sexual slavery, gang rape, public rape, and rape 
with foreign objects.374  
 In 2004, a Liberian relief organization, the Concerned Christian Community 
(CCC), collected information detailing rape and other sexual violence claims and found 
that out of 3,004 cases reported, over half (1,556) were committed by former government 
troops, and 1,104 cases were perpetrated by LURD forces, and very few (11) were 
committed by MODEL forces.375 Interestingly, the organization stated that the low 
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numbers of attacks by MODEL forces was not because they committed fewer acts, but 
because the MODEL troops were situated mostly in counties in the east and south of 
Liberia, including the Grand Bassa, Grand Kru, and Nimba counties, among others, 
where the CCC did not collect data.376 In regards to MODEL forces, Amnesty 
International reported more attacks by MODEL forces the Grand Bassa, Grand Kru, and 
Nimba counties, where they detailed, “Much of the violence appeared to be ethnically 
motivated, with attacks by predominantly Krahn MODEL fighters against civilians from 
the Mano and Gio ethnic groups who were perceived to have supported former president 
Charles Taylor.”377  
 In Liberia, government troops as well as rebel armies (comprised of both civilians 
and soldiers) were responsible for the majority of the sexual violence. Charles Taylor’s 
rebel group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), (and once in office his 
government troops), used rape as a weapon of war, as did Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia 
for Democracy (ULIMO).378 Virtually all sides committed atrocities. However, the 
Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that Taylor’s NPFL was 
responsible for more than three times the number of violations than any other group 
involved in the conflict, including LURD troops.379 
 Human Rights Watch identified a pattern that the government groups often 
followed. Government troops would clear LURD troops out of the area and rape, torture, 
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and kill men, women, and children they thought were supporting the rebel group.380 
According to some accounts, LURD troops sometimes attempted to minimize civilian 
casualties by directing mostly members of their own ethnic groups to a safe place or 
allowing them to leave before the government assault. Furthermore, troops within the 
rebel group were briefed by commanders to respect human rights, including rape.381 
Witnesses reported commanders stepping in to stop rapes from happening.382 Over the 
course of the war, instances like this would no doubt happen within other groups; 
however, LURD troops were the ones documented protecting civilians. Despite this 
documentation, abuses were still committed by LURD rebels against other ethnic groups.  
  In summary, women and girls suffered immensely during the conflict in Liberia. 
It is possible that between 60 and 70 percent of women and girls in Liberia were sexually 
abused or raped during the conflict, lasting from 1989-2003.383 As the Liberian TRC 
found: “Women often constitute more than 50% of a population. In spite of this, their 
contribution, as well as important dimensions of their particular experiences which shape 
both conflict and peace, are underestimated and overlooked.” This remains especially 
true in Liberia where women experienced violence prior to the war, during, and after it. 
 
WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE: SIERRA LEONE 
 
 Similar to the war in Liberia, the war in Sierra Leone from 1991-2002 had terrible 
effects on females of all ages. Women and girls were raped and sexually assaulted 
indiscriminately regardless of their religion, age, or ethnicity. As Binaifer Nowrojee 
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states, “Indiscriminate killings, amputations, rapes, and abductions characterized Sierra 
Leone’s decade-long conflict. The crimes of sexual violence committed against 
thousands of women and girls were extraordinarily brutal and were often accompanied by 
other egregious abuses of the victim and her family.”384 The sexual violence was 
widespread across the country, especially in diamond areas, and was prevalent 
throughout the conflict. Shockingly, a UN report released in 2002 estimated that 72 
percent of Sierra Leonean females encountered some form of human rights abuses and 
that 50 percent experienced sexual violence abuses.385 
 Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) discovered that of 991 households surveyed 
after the war containing internally displaced persons (IDPs), 94 percent reported that they 
had encountered some form of human rights abuse.386 Of the 94 percent, one in eight 
IDPs (9 percent) reported being victim to wartime sexual violence.387 Using this 
prevalence rate of 9 percent, PHR estimates that between 50,000 and 64,000 displaced 
women and girls may have undergone some form of human rights abuse and deduced that 
as many as 215,000-257,000 females in Sierra Leone may have been sexually assaulted 
during the course of the war.388 The types of sexual abuse crimes included rape (89 
percent of victims), forced undressing (37 percent), gang rape (33 percent), abduction (33 
percent), sexual slavery (15 percent), molestation (14 percent), forced marriage (9 
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percent), and rape by a foreign object (4 percent).389 Although certainly not all women in 
Sierra Leone were sexually abused, the human rights violations that women endured were 
prevalent and violent. In addition some women were forced to participate in the violence 
as perpetrators of it. Testimonies given to PHR show that some women were shot if they 
refused to commit acts of violence against others, including amputations, and would be 
forced to watch others commit violent acts such as forced abortions.390 Survivors of 
sexual violence reported not only being sexually assaulted, but testimony from PHR 
showed that they were often gang-raped, or raped in front of other women.391 Rebels 
reportedly extorted their victims, demanding ludicrous amounts of money. When they 
were unable to pay, girls and women were often raped as consolation and the women and 
girls expressed continued shame, regret, and fear.392 
 These abuses were committed by all sides involved in the conflict. While all 
groups bear some responsibility for sexual violence, it was estimated that the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was responsible for the overwhelming majority (95 
percent) of these crimes. The Sierra Leone military and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) 
are believed to have perpetrated the other 5 percent.393  
 Women and girls, aged ten to 18, belonging to every ethnic group and every 
social class were targeted for sexual abuse. These abuses, especially those committed 
against pre-pubescent girls, broke virtually every cultural taboo surrounding sexual 
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relations.394 This, however, was the rebels and other troops’ intent. According to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Sierra Leone, these groups 
“…Deliberately set out to violate every norm and custom of the society to which they 
belonged…with the intention of sowing terror amongst the population, violating women 
and girls and breaking down every norm and custom of traditional society.”395 In addition 
to violating every norm of the society, the TRC found that females were humiliated and 
dehumanized based on the fact that they were simply female, causing lifelong effects 
such as depression, various fistulas, incontinence, family abandonment.396 Furthermore, 
the risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including HIV/AIDS, 
remained extremely high for victims of sexual violence. It is reported that rates of STDs 
among soldiers and military in Sierra Leone were two to five times higher than rates for 
civilian populations and may have been up to fifty times higher during the conflict.397  
 One of the unique characteristics of the sexual violence that occurred during the 
civil war in Sierra Leone was the indiscriminate targeting of females. As described above, 
all ages, social classes, and ethnic groups were attacked. This was unique because no 
specific type of woman, based on religion or group membership, was targeted, unlike the 
wars in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda during the 1990s. For example, at the 
beginning of the conflict in 1991, the RUF and their base was in the Pujehun District 
(mostly home to the Mende ethnic group) in the south of the country, although the RUF 
did not identify as a specific ethnic group. Instead, its main focus was to overthrow the 
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government of Joseph Momoh. Afterward, the RUF moved into the Bo (Mende) and 
Moyamba Districts.398 By 1995, however, the RUF had a significant presence in all 12 
districts of the country and committed atrocities against females in all regions.399 
 The widespread presence of the RUF made the sexual violence and human rights 
abuses even harder to combat because there was no specific target, even some men were 
raped; however, the overwhelming majority of victims of sexual violence were women. 
While the Sierra Leonean TRC found that women were targeted simply because they 
were women, rape and sexual violence was also part of the larger terrorism against entire 
communities. UNIFEM states, “In many contexts, sexual violence is not merely the 
action of rogue soldiers, but a deliberate tactic of warfare. It displaces, terrorizes and 
destroys individuals, families and entire communities, reaching unthinkable levels of 
cruelty against women of all ages from infants to grandmothers.”400 
 Further human rights abuses included amputations, abductions, beatings, and 
torture. These abuses would often precede or follow the sexual crime, or would be 
committed against family members in front of the victims, as a form of torture and 
humiliation.401 Human Rights Watch found that if females resisted, they would often be 
raped so badly they would lose control of their bladders and bowels, and would often be 
raped by using objects such as burning wood, hot oil, or weapons.402  
 One of the well-documented instances of sexual violence during the war was the 
1999 RUF invasion of Freetown. On this occasion, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
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provided treatment to almost 2,000 women that had been sexual assaulted and raped, 
where over half reported being gang raped and 200 were impregnated.403 During this 
same invasion, 2,000 civilians were killed and thousands of children were captured by the 
RUF and made to become soldiers. It is estimated that over 10,000 boys and girls were 
forced to fight over the course of the war.404  
 During the war in Sierra Leone, many females were subject to sexual slavery, 
defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1953 Protocol as “…[T]he status or 
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual 
violence.”405 Girls and women were assigned to “rebel husbands” and forced into sexual 
slavery for long periods of time, and were even forced to birth their “husbands” 
children.406 In many reports on Sierra Leone, such as those by Human Rights Watch, 
there were few distinctions between “bush wives” and women abducted for sexual 
slavery; they are sometimes used interchangeably. For example, a 2001 survey by PHR 
found that 33 percent of respondents had been abducted, and 15 percent of those 
respondents were used for sexual slavery.407 Some testimonies by women that had been 
taken as “bush wives” revealed a certain sense of security in being a “bush wife” versus 
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being “unattached.”408 Bush wives did not have to go out on abduction attacks and were 
sometimes protected from sexual abuse from other soldiers. They were not, however, 
protected against sexual abuse from their own “husbands” and they often lived in fear of 
being killed.409 To deter their escape, soldiers would often tattoo these women or mark 
them with knives, knowing the stigma that would follow them.410 
 In addition to crimes of sexual violence, hand, arm, and leg amputations were also 
common. The Sierra Leonean TRC found that amputations were used mostly to keep 
citizens, especially women, scared and obedient to rebels’ demands. According to the 
TRC, amputations amounted to “…The mutilation and physical and psychological torture 
of those upon whom it was inflicted. The Commission finds the RUF and the AFRC to 
have pursued a deliberate strategy of amputations with the intention of torturing them and 
sowing terror throughout the civilian population.”411  
 There were many reasons for why the RUF would perform amputations, but the 
most prevalent remained the strategy that it would instill fear into citizens and in turn 
they would be compliant and not fight the rebels. In addition, amputations were used to 
discourage citizens from voting, especially for then-President Tejan Kabbah, as the RUF 
was adamant in ensuring that Kabbah would not be re-elected. Furthermore, President 
Kabbah had asked Sierra Leoneans to “join hands for the future” and this instigated the 
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RUF.412 Because of this political statement by the RUF, amputations became one of the 
most well-known aspects of the war. While the number of amputees is unknown, the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council estimate that more than 40 percent of amputee survivors in Sierra Leone are 
women.413 It was also used against men to emasculate them and make them dependent. In 
addition, the amputations, especially the amputations of females, created an aura of 
shame and stigma. Amputations were just one form of violence that men, women, boys, 
and girls were subjugated to during the course of the war. 
  If the women and girls survived rape, sexual slavery, or amputations, the 
consequences remained dire. Because of the stigma discussed in Chapter 1, some did not 
report this specific kind of torture regardless of their condition afterward. However, for 
women amputees, it is impossible to hide and therefore the stigma associated with 
amputation is different than the stigma related to sexual violence; yet shame is attached to 
both crimes. For example, prior to and during the war, women have no rights in regards 
to divorce and if they came forward claiming they were raped, their husbands could leave 
them, rendering them helpless.  
 In summary, in terms of the sexual violence that women and girls experienced 
over the course of the war from 1991-2002, the Sierra Leonean TRC found that: 
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Women and girls became particular targets of malice and violence during the 
conflict. They suffered abduction and exploitation at the hands of the various 
perpetrator factions. Their vulnerability was deliberately exploited in order to 
dehumanise them and perpetrate against them the most gross of violations. They 
were raped, forced into sexual slavery and endured acts of great sexual 
violence.414 
 
Not only were women and girls targeted as individuals, they were purposely abused as 
females in general. It is estimated that 275,000 women in Sierra Leone were victims, 
when in reality, the number could even be much higher given the near-universal 
underreporting of rape in peacetime and wartime.415 
 To conclude, women and girls in Sierra Leone and Liberia experienced 
unprecedented violence over the course of their respective conflicts. In Liberia, between 
60 and 70 percent of the female population experienced some form of sexual violence 
and in Sierra Leone, an estimated 50 percent of women and girls endured sexual violence. 
Compared to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it is estimated that 20,000-50,000 
women were raped, the 200,000 estimated to have been sexually assaulted in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the 250,000-500,000 in Rwanda, the 
percentage of women victimized in Sierra Leone and Liberia is higher than all of the 
other major conflicts where sexual violence has been a key aspect to the war.416 
 Furthermore, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, sexual violence was used to humiliate 
citizens and send a message to society as a whole, where the targets of these crimes were 
most often women and children, of all ethnicities and ages. In addition, the sexual 
violence women and girls experienced in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were tied to the 
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inequality that they experienced prior to war. All sides committed human rights 
violations, although rebel groups were the main perpetrators in both countries. In Sierra 
Leone, amputations In terms of sexual slavery and “bush wives,” occurrences happened 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but was publicized and written about more frequently in 
Sierra Leone, for reasons unknown. 
 Around the world, women and children have historically been left out of the 
reconstruction process. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, this continues to be the case. 
Because of the widespread militarization of both societies during conflict, just because 
the wars are over does not mean the violence is over.417 In the next chapter, we turn to the 
post-conflict period to assess the rate of progress in terms of society, specifically gender-
based policies and see if having a female-led government has made a difference. 
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IV. POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE 
 
 This chapter will focus on the post-conflict situations in both Sierra Leone and 
Liberia.418 It will provide an overview of society and government since the wars ended, 
and an assessment of the post-war status of women and post-conflict sexual violence in 
both countries. 
 
RESPONSES TO WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE: LIBERIA 
 
 As in other countries experiencing civil wars over the past few decades, 
institutions were established in the post-war period in hopes of prosecuting those 
responsible for war crimes as well as providing redress to the many victims of human 
rights abuses. After the war in Liberia was over, the country began its reconstruction 
process. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (1993-1997) and 
the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) transitioned into 
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003.419 According to the United 
Nations, UNMIL “…Would be a multidimensional operation composed of political, 
military, police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, public information and support 
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components, as well as an electoral component in due course.”420 The operation was 
mandated to support the implementation of the 2003 Accra Peace Accord, which 
protected and supported staff, humanitarian assistance, and security reform.421 At the start 
of the mission in 2003, there were over 15,000 military personnel and over 1,000 police 
officers authorized to the country, and as time progressed, and the conflict subsided, the 
number of military and police personnel also decreased.422 
 In terms of transitional justice, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
was mandated by the Accra Peace Accord, and in 2005 the Liberian Legislative 
Assembly approved the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, establishing the 
Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.423 The commission investigated and 
heard statements concerning the period in Liberia from 1979-2003.424 Prior to its 
establishment, the Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), 
Charles Bryant, first appointed the seven commissioners, and in 2005 they were 
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inaugurated and approved by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.425 The individuals serving 
on the Commission included five men and four women (all of whom were Liberian).426 
All of the commissioners were from diverse backgrounds and locations within Liberia; 
however, most had previous experience with human rights activism and civil society.427 
As we will see, it is similar to the Sierra Leonean TRC; the Liberian TRC was not 
mandated to prosecute individuals but was established to uncover the truth of the past.428 
In regards to the commission’s purpose, analyst William Long specifies that “…It opens 
up a public space for reconciliation by allowing a formerly taboo subject to become 
amenable to the action of political bodies and future policies.”429 By the end of the final 
TRC report in 2009, the commission had recorded 163,615 violations from accounts of 
93,322 victims, with forced displacement representing 36 percent of the reported 
violations, making it the most commonly reported violation. In addition, the report found 
that Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was responsible for the 
majority (39 percent) of all violations.430 
 One of the main foci of the TRC mandate was gender, specifically women’s 
experiences during the conflict. The TRC created the TRC Gender Committee in 2006. 
Organizations that aided with the Gender Committee included the UNDP, UNIFEM, the 
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Ministry of Gender and Development, and other Liberian organizations.431 As detailed by 
the TRC, “…A gender committee was established to design and undertake projects that 
focused exclusively on engaging women in the TRC process; and the mainstreaming of 
women, women’s experiences, and women’s roles in other core functions of the TRC.”432 
Out of the Gender Committee, a Gender Unit was created and involved various outreach 
programs including meetings, conferences, and follow up services including counseling 
and medical care.433 Much of the funding was again provided by international 
organizations such as the Foundation Open Society Initiative (FOSI), the Women’s 
Campaign International (WCI), UNDP, and UNIFEM.434 The Gender Unit was able to 
bring together 12 organizations and cover all of Liberia’s 15 counties to establish projects 
that involved women and focused on their experiences.435 These activities included 
providing psychosocial support, engaging with traditional leaders, promoting ongoing 
awareness regarding gender issues, providing referrals for healthcare and trauma 
counseling.436 As the TRC report states, “The main medical and psychological issues that 
presented were internal problems from the sexual violence, depression and suicidal 
ideation.”437 All of these activities were created to raise awareness about and help prevent 
further acts of gender violence.438  
 In addition, the TRC attempted to get women involved in all aspects of the 
Commission’s work. For example, women were heavily recruited as “statement takers,” 
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and when the TRC began gathering testimonials, 100 of the 198 statement takers were 
women and because of this, women were more involved in the Liberian TRC than 
women from previous truth commissions around the world had been.439 
 The gender policy, proposed and created by the TRC’s Gender Unit and Gender 
Committee in 2006, specifically stressed gender equality and focused on women’s 
participation in all aspects of life. Advancing women’s rights was also key to the gender 
policy, including the right to knowledge, the equal right to inherit, the right to work, the 
right to education, and the right to housing. It also sought to promote a strong civil 
society and ensure women’s full participation and economic empowerment.440 The 
TRC’s mandate included the investigation of gross human rights violations of all types, 
and because rape and other forms of gender-based violence were some of the most 
reported crimes over the course of the war, the TRC was obligated, by its own mandate, 
to investigate these accusations.441  
 The gender policy recommended gender-sensitive provisions, including 
promoting gender equity within the overall TRC structure, equal representation of women 
in TRC reports, and equal opportunity and access to TRC programs.442 The gender policy 
exclusively “…Accentuated the references made to gender in the TRC Act, stressing that 
a common understanding of gender equality and equity was key to a thorough 
investigation into the truth about Liberia’s past.”443 This approach would be important in 
rural areas of Liberia, discussion of sexual relations and sexual abuse have been regarded 
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as taboo and because of this, rural women have often remained silent about their 
suffering.444   
 The TRC report did not simply focus on the sexual violence committed against 
women and girls. The commission detailed the disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) process and also the forced recruitment of women and girls in 
combat. After the war, over 100,000 ex-combatants partook in the DDR process, with 
68,952 men, 22,020 females, 8,704 male children, and 2,517 female children 
participating.445 Another report by the International Relations and Security Network 
(ISN) estimated that women and girls made up between 30-40 percent (25,000-30,000) of 
all Liberian fighting forces.446 Because of the high numbers of children that were 
recruited as soldiers during the conflict, President Sirleaf enacted the Children’s Law of 
Liberia in February 2012. According to UNICEF, “…The law is one of the most 
comprehensive pieces of children’s rights legislation in the continent and is largely based 
on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, ratified by Liberia in 1993 and 1992 
respectively.”447 This law seeks to protect the rights of children in areas such as health, 
education, and freedom from abuse and violence.448 
 Interestingly, the 300 women participants in the DDR who did give their 
statements to the TRC did not want to categorize themselves as combatants but rather as 
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victims.449 Such a characterization makes sense, since the TRC revealed that 75 percent 
of the disarmed girls experienced sexual abuse, where rape occurred before, during, and 
after their recruitment.450 Many women and girls who lacked access or were unable to 
participate in the DDR process were prevented from claiming the benefits of the DDR 
process, including programs which reintegrated them back into their societies.451  
 Although women were highly victimized over the course of the war, they were 
not solely victims. Liberian women assembled for peace during the course of the war. In 
1994, women created organizations such as the Liberian Women Initiative (LWI), the 
Women Peace Initiative, the Women in Liberian Liberty (WILL), and the Women in 
Peace Building Network (WIPNET). LWI specifically wanted to place pressure upon all 
factions fighting within the conflict in hopes of ending the war.452 In addition, these 
organizations were key in creating and promoting food aid, rallies, demonstrations, and 
calling for disarmament and peace.453 Regardless of these women’s attempts at 
involvement, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission detailed: 
…The contributions of women in Africa, from Somalia to South Africa, have 
gone largely unnoticed. Dismissed by governments and rebel movements who 
consider making war and peace to be men’s work – and often relegated to the role 
of “victim” by well-intentioned diplomats and aid agencies – women have had to 
fight their own battles for a seat at the peace table.454 
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Because women are oftentimes viewed solely as victims, and are not largely visible in the 
political sphere, as we will see below, they are often dismissed in regards to peace 
processes and in turn, their voices are not heard and their experiences are not understood. 
 In Liberia, the Sirleaf government and organizations did attempt to curtail the 
violence that endured during the 14-year conflict. During the war, all sides committed 
general human rights abuses and extreme levels of sexual violence. By creating the TRC, 
the Liberian leadership attempted to reconcile the atrocities that were perpetrated on 
specific groups of society: women and children. This response, as well as other, will be 
examined later in this chapter.  
 
RESPONSES TO WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE: SIERRA LEONE 
 
 As in Liberia, following the conflict in Sierra Leone, because of the systemic 
nature of the attacks, efforts were made in hopes of combatting the human rights abuses 
and GBV, helping those who suffered, and bringing the perpetrators to justice.  
 After the war in Sierra Leone, the country was focused on rebuilding and 
reconstructing the government infrastructure, and local and national elections were held, 
including presidential elections, in 2002. Then-President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was 
elected to a second term and the military, police force, and judiciary were reformed.455 As 
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) mandate ended, the United 
Nations (UN) created the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) 
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through Resolution 1620 in 2005.456 UNIOSIL was instrumental in improving the 
institutions of the state, developing a plan for establishing a commission on human rights, 
promoting good governance, encouraging free and fair elections, and increasing 
initiatives regarding the safety and security of women and children.457 In addition to 
UNIOSIL, new institutions were created, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) (created in 2002), and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which 
began its operation in 2002 and ended in 2004. In regards to the gender-based violence 
that occurred during the conflict, the SCSL and the TRC have been seen as important 
contributors to gender-sensitive transitional justice.458 
 In August 2000, the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Security 
Council (under UNSC Resolution 1315) established the SCSL, a hybrid court similar to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), in order to prosecute the main 
perpetrators, or offenders, of the conflict.459 The court began operation in 2002 and is 
scheduled to finish after the conclusion of the Charles Taylor appeal sometime in 2013. 
The court has two trial chambers and an appeals chamber, with justices, male and female, 
from countries all over the world, including Sierra Leone.460 Aside from the Charles 
Taylor trial, which was moved to The Hague because of fears that it would provoke 
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instability and political unrest, the SCSL trials were held within Sierra Leone, in hopes of 
combatting impunity and allowing for the community to see perpetrators punished for 
their crimes.461 The court was authorized to try individuals responsible for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, which include sexual violence and rape, committed from 
November 1996- 2002.462 While the Lomé Peace Agreement, signed in 1999, granted 
amnesty to all parties involved in the war, the UN refused to recognize the amnesties due 
to the fact that war crimes and crimes against humanity are accountable under 
international law.463  
 In regards to the SCSL’s role, analyst Valerie Oosterveld details, “While the 
primary role of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and other similar tribunals is to 
consider the culpability of individuals for serious international crimes, they also have 
important secondary roles, including the provision of justice for victims.”464 In cases 
where the human rights violations were so widespread and resources were so limited, (as 
in the conflict in Sierra Leone), it is impossible to punish each perpetrator.465 Therefore, 
courts such as the SCSL and the TRC compensate for this failure by attempting to reveal 
experiences of the victims and establish a “social peace” in hopes that the atrocities do 
not happen again in the future.466 As mentioned earlier, the mandate of the TRC was to 
address impunity, respond to the necessities of the victims affected, reconcile society, and 
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ensure that the abuses could occur in the future.467 The TRC was widely regarded as an 
important step in transitional justice and an alternative to judicial proceedings.  
 As of August 2012, the SCSL had indicted 21 individuals and ten of those 
indictments included sexual violence charges.468 Of the ten defendants with sexual 
violence charges against them, seven have been convicted, with the remaining three 
either deceased or still on trial. This includes Charles Taylor. Although Taylor played a 
large part in the civil war in Liberia and was president of Liberia for a period of time, he 
was charged and indicted in March 2003 by the SCSL for his role in the Sierra Leonean 
war.469 Taylor’s 11 counts include charges of rape, rape, sexual slavery, physical violence, 
enslavement, acts of terrorism, and pillage, among others.470 While Taylor was not 
accused of personally committing some of these offenses, he was charged with the crimes 
and was found to bear “culpable responsibility” because of his complicity and direct 
knowledge that these events were occurring.471 One of the more serious charges against 
him involves his membership in a “joint criminal enterprise.” Analyst Gill Wigglesworth 
explains:  
Not only is Taylor alleged to have directly ordered crimes and to have aided and 
abetted them, he is also alleged to have participated in a joint criminal enterprise, 
the consequence of which was that many of the atrocities committed against the 
civilian population were either actions within the joint criminal enterprise or a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise.472 
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His trial, which began in January 2008, lasted for over four years. Taylor was found 
guilty on April 26, 2012 and his conviction has been seen as a victory for international 
and gender justice because it represented the first time a former president has been held 
responsible for wartime sexual violence and GBV.473 Following his conviction in 2012, 
Taylor was sentenced to 50 years in prison, to be served in the United Kingdom (as 
agreed upon by the SCSL and the International Criminal Court (ICC).474 This conviction 
of a former political leader is remarkable; it is next to impossible to prosecute for rape in 
such cases because the burden of proof is difficult to establish. However, as Binaifer 
Nowrojee states, “…The experience of the Special Court illustrates that sexual crimes 
can be effectively addressed if the appropriate political will exists. Despite having 
significantly fewer resources and staff at his disposal than the ad hoc tribunals possess, 
Prosecutor David Crane has made a concerted effort to deliver justice to Sierra Leonean 
victims of sexual violence.”475 
 As opposed to international criminal courts, which focus on the intellectual 
architects and major perpetrators of the war, truth commissions focus mostly on the 
victims. The commission in Sierra Leone dealt with crimes committed in that country 
from 1991-1999. As detailed by the TRC, “The Commission did not make findings on 
questions of innocence or guilt. It made factual findings in relation to responsibility and 
accountability.”476 Just as importantly, the TRC aims to provide a historical record of the 
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conflict.477 The TRC was active from November 2002 until October 2004, when it 
finished its final report and submitted it to the United Nations Security Council.478 
 As part of its work, in May 2003, the TRC dedicated three days of hearings 
specific to the crimes committed against women during the civil war. The goals regarding 
these three days included: having women’s voices heard, erasing the stigma surrounding 
rape, and restoring victims’ dignity.479 The victims were able to choose whether to give 
their testimonies publicly or privately and only female commissioners questioned the 
victims, in attempts to make them more comfortable and more willing to give their 
testimony.480  
 In its final report submitted in 2004, the TRC detailed that the war in Sierra Leone 
was mostly a war of Sierra Leoneans fighting other Sierra Leoneans and all fighting 
groups targeted civilians with indiscriminate violence and human rights abuses in which 
the war broke all societal traditions.481 The TRC released a 1,500 page report complete 
with a 3,500 page annex.482 The report focused on every aspect of the war, including the 
roots and causes of the conflict, the conflict period itself, and the human rights abuses 
that occurred.  
 Over 40,000 violations were reported to the commission. The commission 
identified and heard testimony from over 10,000 victims, with 33.5 percent being 
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female.483 The TRC found that the casualties were mostly male but that women and 
children were singled out for some of the worst abuses seen in any conflict, including 
child victims/soldiers, sexual violence, and displacement.484 Forced displacement 
accounted for the largest proportion of violations with almost 8,000 counts being reported, 
while 1,303 counts of rape, sexual slavery, and sexual abuse were reported to the 
commission (which is a small fraction of the estimated total partly due to the 
unwillingness of many victims to come forward).485 Many Sierra Leonean refugees 
(mostly women and children) sought exile in Guinea. However, many of these refugees 
experienced violence at the hands of the Guinean military.486 In addition to the mentioned 
crimes, other crimes committed largely against women included forced recruitment, 
forced sterilization, mutilation, forced detention, forced displacement, and forced 
drugging.487 Furthermore, the commission found that over half (60.5 percent) of the total 
violations from 1991 to 1999/2000 were committed by the RUF, and that the RUF 
committed the most violations during the entire conflict period in general.488 
 While the exact number is unknown, it has been estimated that ten to 50 percent 
of combatants in various armed forces groups in Sierra Leone were women.489 There are 
estimates that rebel groups such as the RUF recruited or coerced girls into becoming 
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child soldiers, and these girls comprised one-third of their forces (as both wives and 
soldiers). While the number of females that actually fought is unknown, one estimate by 
the TRC claimed that 44 percent of the girls interviewed had weapons training and 
knowledge of fighting tactics; if this is any indication, the number of girls who fought in 
combat could be very high.490 Yet female combatants received very little help after the 
war. For example, only eight percent of individuals helped by the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) plan established after the war were women. As 
analyst Marda Mustapha points out, the DDR focused exclusively on male combatants 
and “…Was a clear manifestation of the continued marginalization of and insensitivity 
towards women even in time of peace.”491 Interestingly, in regards to females as 
perpetrators of violence and combatants, the TRC found that these women and girls 
suffered a “double victimization.” The Sierra Leonean TRC found that in most cases, 
they were forced to fight against their will and secondly, are stigmatized by society 
because of their involvement in the war.492 After the war women who performed these 
roles were often resented and shunned for violating traditional gender roles which 
promote female subordination and enforce male domination.493  
 After its investigation, the TRC issued a report making various recommendations 
to the government of Sierra Leone and suggesting various ways to improve conditions in 
the country. Although the largest portion of the report dealt with corruption, a section was 
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devoted to women, titled “Women and Armed Conflict.”494 Specific recommendations 
included the removal of structural inequality, making medical services available to 
females, and legislative protection for women and girls.495 One of the major 
recommendations was the amending of certain customary laws. This included reversing 
the law that required rape victims to marry their offenders, and reversing discrimination 
in regards to inheritance, political participation, property ownership, and divorce.496 In 
2007, the Sierra Leonean parliament passed laws banning domestic violence and forced 
marriage, and now allows women to own property and have rights in terms of divorce 
and child custody.497  
 While women were targeted indiscriminately during the conflict, they were not 
simple bystanders to the violence. Many women’s groups, including the Sierra Leone 
Association of University Women (SLAUW) and Women Organised for a Morally 
Enlightened Nation (WOMEN), were active in campaigning for peace. These 
organizations campaigned for peace and also usher in a democratic government. 
Specifically, SLAUW was instrumental in creating the Sierra Leone Women’s Forum 
that encompassed over 50 women’s organizations within the country and encouraged the 
peace process in 1994.498 The Women’s Forum and WOMEN encouraged the peace 
process by organizing conferences, demonstrations, debates, and rallies in order to gain 
support and increase knowledge about the peace process and the 1996 elections. Their 
promotion of the peace process and democratization was to no avail at times, as there 
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were no women invited to participate in the Abidjan Peace Accord; instead only men 
associated with major parties of the Sierra Leonean government, and the RUF, the 
president of Côte d'Ivoire, and various other organizations were included in the 
meetings.499  
 However, more organizations arose because of women’s increased participation 
and little by little, women in Sierra Leone became known as leaders in civil society, not 
only as victims.500 As stated by the TRC, “Women played a major role in the peace 
process that led to the end of the conflict. After enduring years of destruction and chaos, 
women began to assume constructive roles as mediators and peacemakers.”501 Many of 
the organizations that were started during this time focused on specifically on human and 
gender rights, including gender and sexual violence, such as the Campaign for Good 
Governance, Current Evangelism Ministries (Women at Risk Program), Grassroots 
Empowerment for Self Reliance (GEMS), Mano River Women's Peace Network, Sierra 
Leone Women Development Movement, The Mother's Union, Young Women's Christian 
Association of Sierra Leone, and Youth Wing/Women's Wing.502 
 To summarize, the wars in both Sierra Leone and Liberia contributed to a large 
number of casualties and human rights abuses. In both conflicts, civilians were deliberate 
targets. In Sierra Leone it is estimated that over 50,000 were killed (0.01 percent of the 
population) and over six times as many people (300,000) were killed over the course of 
the war in Liberia (1 percent of the population). In Sierra Leone it has been estimated that 
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as much as 72 percent of the female population encountered some form of human rights 
abuse and 50 percent were victims of sexual abuse over the course of the war.503 In 
Liberia, a similar proportion has been estimated where between 60 and 70 percent of 
women and girls experienced some form of sexual violence or rape.504 In addition, over 
600,000 Liberians were displaced, with 80 percent being women and children.505 In 
Sierra Leone, far fewer people, close to 10,000 citizens were displaced, with over 36 
percent being women and children.506 However, this is a relatively low percentage, where 
approximately half of refugee populations around the world are women.507  
 In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, not only were women and children most often 
targeted for human rights abuses. Women and children in both conflicts experienced 
mass sexual assault, forced displacement, mutilation, torture, and abduction; neither case 
was worse or better for women or the population in general. No specific ethnic group was 
targeted in either country; human rights violations and killings were more generalized to 
the entire population. In the way that the RUF was primarily responsible for the 
destruction and fighting in Sierra Leone, the NPFL was primarily responsible in Liberia 
for most of the fighting; however, all parties committed human rights abuses and engaged 
in combat. Both societies experienced widespread destruction. In addition, both 
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eventually ended their respective wars with help from the international community. But 
just because the wars are over does not mean the violence is over.508 
 
POST-CONFLICT SITUATION: LIBERIA 
 
 At the cessation of the conflict in 2003, nearly 40 percent of Liberia’s population 
was considered undernourished, and adult life expectancy was only 41 years old.509 After 
a fourteen year conflict, as one might expect, the country was destroyed. All aspects of 
life were affected, as documented by the Liberian TRC. Given these circumstances 
analyst Mike McGovern questions what it would, or will continue to take, for Liberia to 
fully achieve reconstruction and peace building. He states, “There may not be a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach to this. In Liberia, it will require a much longer term commitment 
to the country than is typically imagined…It will also require long-term engagement with 
the security sector, and a new look at issues of governance, [and] corruption…”510 This 
long-term engagement is necessary and crucial to the post-conflict period because, as 
McGovern details, the destruction of the country and its people were deliberate (which is 
common with most wars), and because of the tumultuous history of Liberia, its citizens 
cannot “look back” to a better time period, they must look forward instead.511 In 2012, 
nine years after the conflict, Liberia remains relatively “unpeaceful,” as evaluated on the 
Global Peace Index (GPI), ranking 96 out of 153 countries.512 
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 How has the country fared with a female-led government? On the one hand, 
overall in regards to the rule of law in Liberia, the country outperforms most of Sub-
Saharan Africa in terms of government accountability and security and fundamental 
rights. But it remains level with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of open 
government and regulatory enforcement and access to justice.513 After being elected 
president of Liberia in the first post-conflict vote in 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf made the 
reconstruction of the country her top priority. For some analysts, such as Emily Stanger 
and Molly Kinder, the election of President Sirleaf was not only symbolic, it potentially 
shattered a long-standing glass ceiling for women politicians and women in general, 
where President Sirleaf called women her “greatest constituency.”514 As Stanger and 
Kinder detail, “In recognition of the centrality of women in her election, President Sirleaf 
declared in her inaugural address that she would ‘endeavor to give Liberian women 
prominence in all affairs of our country’ and to ‘try to provide economic programs that 
enable Liberian women…”515 Much of the international community has agreed. In 2006, 
President Sirleaf was named one of Forbes’ most powerful women in the world, and in 
2010 Time magazine called her one of the top ten female leaders in world.516 In addition, 
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President Sirleaf, along with two other women (one Liberian), won the 2011 Nobel Peace 
Prize.517 
Steady explains how Sirleaf’s presidential election win in 2005 is considered a 
landmark election not only for women, but also for men where “Women saw this as a 
major advance for women and men saw this as breaking a taboo, which would make it 
easier for women to serve as heads of state.”518 In 2005, President Sirleaf received close 
to 60 percent of the votes, and in 2011, she received over 90 percent of the vote for 
president.519 Given that women in Liberia constitute half of the population, it can be 
assumed that indeed men voted for Sirleaf in 2005 and 2011, though in 2011 only 37 
percent of registered voters in Liberia actually voted.520 The low voter turnout was not 
the only problem associated with the 2011 election. Her opponent, Liberian diplomat 
Winston Tubman, boycotted the second round of elections after claiming voter fraud; 
however, international observers from 31 countries found little evidence to support his 
claims, and her administration is largely viewed by Liberians and the international 
community as legitimate.521  
 Yet, other analysts, such as Gwynn Thomas and Melinda Adams question 
whether women have actually broken the glass ceiling of national leadership or whether 
gendered cultural beliefs continue to ring true in regards to national political 
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leadership.522 Thomas and Adams state that the election of Johnson-Sirleaf was unique 
for many reasons. Not only is she one of the few women in the world elected to national 
presidency without powerful familial political connections, she won the presidency in 
Liberia through the popular vote and was also elected president in a country with historic 
political instability, including high levels of gender violence.523 Her election is 
remarkable; however, having a woman president, or prime minister, does not simply 
equate to a national government that is dominated by women, nor does it equate to 
feminist or female-friendly policies.524  
 As Thomas and Adams detail, women’s political representation in Liberia is 
actually below West African averages, where women hold on average 12.5 percent of the 
seats in lower houses and 16.7 percent of seats in the upper houses; these numbers in 
Liberia have doubled since 1997 when women held less than six percent of the lower 
house seats.525 Still, it is interesting to note that while the Liberian National Elections 
Commission adopted a law in 2005 that sought to ensure that at least 30 percent of 
candidates running for office should be women, the quota is not enforced. In order for 
women to increase their political participation, however, the executive leadership must be 
more willing to push for women’s inclusion in politics, specifically in the more powerful 
cabinet positions. 
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 Furthermore, the Liberian parliament continues to fall behind other post-conflict 
African countries in regards to female representation.526 For example, women in Rwanda 
comprise more than 50 percent of their national parliament, and more than 40 percent of 
South Africa’s members of parliament are women. 
 While the gender quota is hardly enforced, analyst Veronika Fuest explains how 
women’s roles and opportunities have shifted as a result of the conflict. For example, 
since the war, women have been able to embrace more leadership roles in different 
sectors of Liberian society, including religious, political, and civil divisions, due to 
vacancies left because of the war and government shakeups. Although women have taken 
up new responsibilities after the war, they have not been able to exercise the power that 
usually comes with those responsibilities and positions. For example, women have made 
political gains in terms of appointments yet have not amassed the power to enact gender 
reform. Have these changing roles and opportunities changed women’s status and current 
rights in Liberia? In addition to more female representation in the upper and lower house 
of the Liberian legislature, the first female chief of the police force was nominated by 
President Sirleaf, and 22 percent of President Sirleaf’s cabinet members were female in 
2008.527 As of 2012, 28.5 percent of her cabinet were women, a slight increase from 2008. 
Other leadership positions occupied by women include mayors (33 percent of the 
country’s mayors were women in 2011) and Supreme Court judges (two of the five 
judges were women).528 These appointments are signs that women are gaining more 
leadership within society, but are these women the exception rather than the rule? Or 
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have these advancements infiltrated other levels of Liberian society and are they 
changing the culture concerning women? 
 Historically and presently, women have encompassed the majority of Liberia’s 
work force, making up more than 50 percent of informal and formal workers. However, 
they continue to occupy the least profitable sectors of the economy.529 As detailed by 
Stanger and Kinder, “A striking 90 percent of working women are employed in the 
informal sector or in agriculture, compared to 75 percent of working men. In contrast, 
men are more than three times as likely to be employed by the civil service, 
nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, or public corporations.”530 
Because of these employment differences, men are much more likely to be paid for their 
work, or paid more for their work, versus women who are most often clustered into the 
lowest paying of the informal sectors of the economy and associated with their 
occupations, men are also more likely to have higher skills and education. For example, 
the top occupations for women, other than agriculture, are petty trading or street vending 
whereas men occupy mostly professional or clerical jobs, requiring higher skill levels and 
receiving higher pay.531 This disparity is present despite the fact that women in Liberia 
make important and substantial contributions to their family’s household incomes and 
also to the Liberian economy as a whole.532 
 Other aspects of women’s lives remain determined by their gender as well. 
According to the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), which rates countries 
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based on women’s status and rights, Liberia ranks in the lower third (62 out of 89).533 Not 
only does Liberia rank low in terms of general human development, Liberia continues to 
rank low in terms of gender equality, explained by a discriminatory family code, 
restricted physical integrity, restricted civil liberties, and high levels of maternal 
mortality.534  
 However, Liberia’s maternal mortality rate improved from 1990 when 1,100 
deaths occurred per 100,000 live births to 2008 when the level was 990 deaths per 
100,000 live births.535 On the other hand, to illustrate the large disparity between Liberia 
and other parts of the world, Liberia’s maternal mortality rate in 2011 was relative to 
Sweden’s maternal mortality rate in the 17th century.536 Furthermore, women’s life 
expectancy remains low, at 58 years old, and only ten percent of married women use 
contraception.537 Women also comprise the majority (over 50 percent) of adults in 
Liberia living with HIV/AIDS.538 The rate of HIV positive pregnant women receiving 
antiretrovirals has increased doubly since 2003 and the number of new infections among 
infants has steadily declined since 2003.539  
 When it comes to education, Liberia continues to have lower female enrollment 
rates in regards to both primary and secondary schooling, where 85 percent of boys 
attend primary school whereas only 60 percent of girls are enrolled. Following this trend, 
in 2011, 25 percent of school-aged boys are enrolled in secondary school in Liberia 
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whereas only 14 percent of school-aged girls attend secondary school. Despite this 
disparity, however, it is interesting to note that 80 percent of girls aged 15-24 are literate 
(compared to 70 percent of boys).540 In terms of the overall adult literacy rate, however, 
only 53 percent of women compared to 63 percent of men are considered literate.541 On 
the other hand, this is an increase from 1970 when female literacy rates in Liberia were 
eight percent and from 1985 when female literacy rates were 23 percent.542 These 
numbers reflect a generational shift that shows females (despite disadvantages in access 
to education) to be catching up and surpassing males. 
 It is evident from the information presented above that progress for women in 
general has been slow since the conflict ended in Liberia. At her inauguration, President 
Sirleaf promised to provide “quick and visible progress” grouped under four major 
pillars: Security, Economic Revitalization, Basic Services and Infrastructure, and Good 
Governance.543 As an economist, economic revitalization and swift action against 
corruption has been at the forefront of President Sirleaf’s agenda. In post-conflict 
situations, economic revitalization and corruption often receive the most attention, and 
other issues, such as the persistence of violence, especially gender violence, receive much 
less attention. This is no different, even with a female executive. According to analyst 
Bruce Baker, as far as crime and policing:  
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Like many African countries, Liberia is seeking to make policing provision the 
sole prerogative of the state. Here is a police service with few radios, vehicles, 
and skills; and yet the government assures the public that by achieving its 
recruitment target of 3500 police officers it is going to be able to provide crime 
protection and investigation for a population of 3 million.544 
 
In terms of other aspects of the rule of law, Liberia continues to fare poorly, according to 
organizations such as the World Justice Project, Transparency International, and Freedom 
House. For example, the World Justice Project ranked Liberia last in the region in areas 
such as open government, effective regulatory enforcement, effective civil justice, and 
effective criminal justice.545 In particular, Liberia ranks exceptionally low in terms of law 
stability and comprehensibility, and due process.546 Given this information, it is not 
surprising then that Liberia has many persisting post-conflict problems with violence. 
According to the 2012 Global Peace Index, Liberia ranks “less peaceful” on a spectrum 
in areas such as perceived criminality in society, homicides, access to weapons, security 
officers and police, violence crime, and political instability.547  
 One of the most prevalent, long-standing issues in Liberia today, and a central 
focus to this study, is the widespread sexual violence that has continued since the 
cessation of formal conflict. Because the sexual violence in Liberia was such a pervasive 
part of the conflict, President Sirleaf and her government enacted a gender-based 
violence National Plan of Action in 2005, shortly after her election. Institutional and 
legislative reforms were made to the Liberian system, specifically concerning rape and 
sexual violence. In 2008, a new sex-crimes court, Criminal Court E, dedicated to 
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prosecuting rape and other sexual violence acts was created by the Liberian government 
and began functioning in February 2009.548 For example, according to a new law, if 
convicted, a perpetrator could receive life in prison for first degree rape, or ten years 
imprisonment for second degree rape. However, often a more punishing sentence actually 
means that fewer rapists are tried and/or found guilty because members of society and 
law enforcement are often hesitant to impose stiff sentences. Given this information, very 
few perpetrators have been prosecuted for rape or sexual violence since the passing of 
this new law and court. 
 While the new law and court are important initiatives, Cummings reveals, 
“…Actual indicators show that sexual violence remains prevalent, and that six years after 
Liberia’s peace settlement and nearly four years after the passage of its new rape law and 
President Sirleaf’s election, key reforms have yet to take hold in a way that appreciably 
deters the problem of rape and gender-based violence.”549 For example, in one hospital in 
Monrovia in 2008, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) treated 771 rape victims and only 
four of their cases were pursued in court.550 Also in 2008, 780 rape cases were reported to 
the Liberian National Police and less than 25 percent of those cases went to court, 
perceivably due to lack of evidence or the cases being settled privately.551 For example, 
the UN found that between April 2010 and March 2011, only 38 of the reported 903 rape 
cases reached trial, and only 17 resulted in convictions.552 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 Sara Kuipers Cummings, “Liberia’s “New War”: Post-Conflict Strategies for Confronting Rape and 
Sexual Violence,” Arizona State Law Journal (2011): 239. 
549 Ibid, 242. 
550 Ibid, 242. 
551 Ibid, 243. 
552 United Nations General Assembly Security Council, “Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,” (2012): 19. 
	  
119 
 In addition, the definition of rape itself was changed to include penetration with 
any object, where this had previously been left out, and anyone under the age of 18 is 
unable to consent to sexual acts, whereas previously there was no age of consent.553 In 
addition, rape is no longer a bail able offense, whereas prior to 2006, a suspect could be 
arrested and released the next day.554 Regardless of these legislative changes, analyst Sara 
Kuipers Cummings points out that these initiatives mean little because rape prosecutions 
“…Require effective police forces, operating judicial institutions, and the additional 
infrastructure of functioning and accessible health clinics.”555 In addition to only having 
3,500 police officers for the entire country, the police force had three functioning patrol 
cars in 2003 and the force continues to only be ten percent female, as opposed to the TRC 
recommended 20 percent.556 
 In addition to an inadequate police force, only three of the 130 magistrates in 
Liberia had law degrees in 2006, and half of the 300 justices of the peace were 
illiterate.557 Furthermore, some villages and towns in Liberia do not have functioning 
courts, making access to justice almost impossible. In other places with operative courts, 
some only function 42 days out of the year.558  
 But even if these legal reforms were implemented, it is easier to change a law than 
a culture.559 Since the war, rape continues to be the most reported crime in the country 
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according to police statistics, and as UNICEF states, “Sexual violence occurs across all 
socio-economic and cultural backgrounds; women may be socialized to accept, tolerate or 
rationalize it. A weak justice system, the lingering violence of the war and an 
unwillingness to report instances compound the situation. No one is safe from assault.”560 
Higher reporting rates may be attributed to Liberia’s National Plan of Action and 
Criminal Court E, both of which have increased women and girls’ access to justice. In 
terms of the permeation of a culture of sexual violence, The New York Times columnist 
Nicholas Kristof describes the rape of a seven-year-old girl in Liberia, where many of the 
victims are younger than 13 years old. Kristof details “…Somehow mass rape survived 
the end of the war; it has been easier to get men to relinquish their guns than their sense 
of sexual entitlement.”561 This is just one example of observers taking note of this trend 
in Liberia. Others include UNICEF, UNIFEM, IRIN, the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC), the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), and the Association of 
Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL), among others. 
 A government survey for the period of 2005/2006 found that 92 percent of the 
1,600 women and girls interviewed said they had been raped or endured some other form 
of sexual violence since the war ended.562 From October-December 2006, 164 cases of 
GBV were reported to the IRC in Lofa County alone.563 In 2007, four years after the war, 
the IRC found that 12 percent of girls 17 years old and under had been sexually assaulted 
in the last year and a half.564 In a similar study in 2007, the Liberian Demographic and 
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Health Survey (LDHS) found that 45 percent of women ranging from 15-49 years of age 
had experienced some form of physical violence and 20 percent had been sexually 
assaulted since the war has ended.565 From January-April 2009, Doctors without Borders 
treated 275 sexual violence victims in Liberia, and 28 percent were younger than four and 
33 percent were between the ages of five and 12.566 Indeed, police and clinical reports 
show that over 60 per cent of rape victims in recent years in Liberia are girls of less than 
18 years.”567 As the country demobilizes, the perpetrators are no longer soldiers; they are 
more likely to be teachers, husbands, and other family members.568  
 In fact, according to the IRC, domestic violence, which is not illegal in Liberia, 
has also become increasingly common (both during conflict and after).569 The domestic 
abuse that women face in Liberia does not only affect women’s lives, but it prevents the 
country as a whole from moving forward from the conflict and should be seen as a 
humanitarian issue.570 According IRC President Robert Rupp, “Domestic violence is 
often considered a private matter, minimised as a cultural practice or seen as an issue that 
can be addressed only after peace and development take hold.”571 But, a 2008 WANEP 
study found that while the intensity of the sexual violence, such as sexual slavery and/or 
gang rape, has decreased since the height of the conflict, women continue to be exposed 
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to “survival sex” (such as prostitution), sexual harassment and domestic violence.572 As 
analyst Babatunde Ahonsi details, “This is because intimate relations have become more 
militarised, a legacy of the normalisation or tolerance of sexual violence that developed 
during the long years of open warfare. Unlike the special rape law, which was instituted 
in Liberia after the war and banned rape for the first time in the country’s history, there is 
no push for law or legislation regarding domestic violence; instead, it is viewed primarily 
as a private family matter.573 
 Clearly, the post-conflict sexual violence continues ten years after the wars’ end. 
Because the war broke virtually every societal taboo concerning sexual and gender 
violence, rape and sexual abuse have continued at high levels, despite the cessation of 
conflict.574 AFELL states that even today they receive reports of at least six rape cases 
each day.575 Because the conflict has ceased, it is no longer possible to simply say that 
soldiers are the perpetrators. It is more difficult to point out the offenders because 
soldiers and rebels have began to reintegrate back into society and now include teachers, 
religious leaders, and male family members.576 However, as seen above, even when 
women and girls do come forward, they still receive little recourse. In regards to the 
connection between sexual violence and domestic violence, there will be no progress 
against one until the other is also dealt with. 
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POST-CONFLICT SITUATION: SIERRA LEONE 
 The civil war in Sierra Leone that lasted from 1991-2002 nearly destroyed Sierra 
Leonean society. Coming out of the war, in 2002, Sierra Leone ranked last (173 out of 
173) on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Report on civil liberties, political rights, press freedom, rule of law, corruption, and 
political stability.577 In addition, in 2002 when the conflict was over, Sierra Leone ranked 
last (173 out of 173) in regards to life expectancy (38.9 years of age), adult literacy rate 
(36 percent), and GDP per capita ($490 U.S. dollars).578  
Today, in regards to health and healthcare in Sierra Leone, both women and men 
have some of the lowest life expectancies in the world in 2009, with 49 years of age for 
women and 46 years of age for men.579 Over half of the people living with HIV/AIDS in 
the country are women (55 percent), with only 18 percent of the overall population able 
to receive antiretroviral therapy (ART) treatment for advanced HIV infection.580  
 Similar to Liberia, Sierra Leone had a long tumultuous journey ahead in order to 
achieve some sort of reconciliation and healing. As mentioned earlier, the first post-
conflict presidential elections (held in 2007) ushered in democratically elected President 
Ernest Bai Koroma of the All People’s Congress (APC). This was a surprising 
development, according to the International Crisis Group, “The APC victory climaxed a 
remarkable turnaround in the fortunes of a party whose reputation had seemed 
irredeemably tarnished by association with the corrupt pre-war oligarchies led by Siaka 
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Stevens and J.S. Momoh.”581 But President Koroma appealed to the voters by promising 
to battle corruption and patronage that has historically caused problems for the country, 
and also to lower poverty rates and deal with other societal problems, such as violence 
against women.582   
 Specifically regarding women, Koroma stated that gender equality is critical in 
achieving good governance in Sierra Leone. In a compilation of various speeches, 
President Koroma has called women in Sierra Leone as “everything,” and has stated that 
their roles in society must be appreciated.583 He appears to have lived up to his word as 
the Koroma administration apologized on behalf of the government for the atrocities that 
women and girls faced throughout the course of the civil war, a recommendation made by 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).584 President Koroma has not been 
without criticism, however; much of this criticism has come from citizens wanting more 
improvement fighting poverty. Women’s organizations in Sierra Leone, such as Women 
in Security Sector-Sierra Leone (WISS-SL), have thanked him for putting women’s 
issues on the forefront of his administration, specifically for his appointment of Naasu 
Fofanah to Gender Specialist in the Office of the President in July 2012.585 In addition, a 
columnist for Newstime Africa writes, “The international community has reaffirmed its 
support and commitment to the Koroma-led administration. The amount of assistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 International Crisis Group, “Sierra Leone: A New Era for Reform?,” (2008): 1. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Cokorioko International Newspaper, “President Koroma Says Agenda For Prosperity Will Empower 
Women In Sierra Leone,” last modified September 5, 2012, http://www.cocorioko.net/?p=36256. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Cocorioko International Newspaper, “Women In Security Sector Laud President Ernest Bai Koroma,” 
last modified July 30, 2012, http://www.cocorioko.net/?p=34523. 
	  
125 
flowing into the country is a clear manifestation of the confidence stakeholders have on 
the President Ernest Bai Koroma and his government.”586  
 In Sierra Leone, as of 2012, women hold 12.5 percent of the seats in parliament. 
This is below world averages, but is a significant increase from 1995 when females 
comprised only 6.25 percent members of parliament, holding five out of 80 seats.587 In 
addition to their improved representation in the legislature, President Koroma appointed 
three women in 2002 to ministerial positions (Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and 
Children’s Affairs, Minister of Trade and Industry, and Minister of Health).588 Since the 
2007 elections, the president appointed two more women to ministerial positions 
including Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Minister of 
Energy and Power.589 This is significant given that trade and industry and energy and 
power are not fields traditionally left to women. In 2008, the president appointed Her 
Ladyship Umu Hawa Tejan-Jalloh as the first female Chief Justice and Kestoria Kabia, 
the country’s first female Brigadier.590 Most recently, in September 2012, the Sierra 
Leonean Minister of Health and Sanitation, Zainab Hawa Bangura, a key advisor to 
President Koroma in matters such as foreign affairs and international cooperation, was 
appointed as the United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict.591  
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 While Liberia is the only country in Africa to have a female head of state, it is not 
the only country to have a female run for president. For example, in Sierra Leone in 2002, 
Zainab Bangura (the current Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary 
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict) ran for president, but only received 0.6 percent 
of the vote, tying for sixth place. Bangura is not a lifelong politician and only first 
emerged as a political figure in 2002. Prior to running for president in 2002, she founded 
Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation (W.O.M.E.N.) and was a civil 
society activist.592 Interestingly, her presidential loss has been attributed to her stance on 
instituting age restrictions on female genital cutting (FGC) in Sierra Leone (where nearly 
90 percent of girls have had the procedure).593 Bangura lost to Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, 
who won 70 percent of the vote, and was re-elected president by avoiding such 
controversies such as FGC and by focusing on disarmament and building unity after the 
war.	  
As women increase their visibility in the political sphere, there will undoubtedly 
be more female candidates for president to come.594 However, in 2012, opposition 
presidential candidate Julius Maada Bio stated that running more women on the ticket 
would be “political suicide.”595 Interestingly, however, Bio selected Kadi Sesay, a 
woman, as his running mate (and had he won, she would have been the country’s first 
female vice president).596 His decision to choose Dr. Sesay has been seen as a strategy to 
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garner votes in the north of country, given that she is from the north (as is President 
Koroma), and also to acquire female votes in general.597 But, evidently there are limits on 
how far they were willing to pursue the female voter, perhaps out of fear that it would 
alientate men. Arguing that it would cause them to lose, Bio and Sesay only endorsed 10 
women from their party for parliament.  
In the 2012 Sierra Leonean elections, only 38 women ran for parliamentary 
positions, compared to 548 men.598 Furthermore, only 337 women ran in local elections, 
out of 1,283 candidates.599 In terms of the parliamentary election results, President 
Koroma’s All People’s Congress (APC) held the majority, winning 67 of the 124 seats in 
parliament and gaining eight seats.600 More women were willing to run in the 2012 
elections than in 2002 and 2007. Of the candidates running for parliament, women won 
16 total seats, eight from the APC, and eight from the Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP); the same number as in 2007.601 This continued gender gap can be attributed to 
many things including a lack of education and employment opportunities. 
In regards to women and leadership positions in Sierra Leone, Steady points out, 
“The overall progress for women in political leadership is slow, but women are 
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advocating for increased participation, becoming more organized, and presenting 
candidates for election.”602 Regardless of this perceived progress, women only make up 
ten percent of the national cabinet and 11 percent of elected councilors at the local 
level.603 As mentioned earlier, although a quota requiring parties to have 30 percent 
women was recommended by the TRC in 2004, no such quota has been installed in Sierra 
Leone. As we have seen, however, the existence of a quota does not necessarily mean 
results; in Liberia a 30 percent quota for women on party lists has done little in regards to 
women elected to parliament and other offices. Still, women in Sierra Leone continue to 
push for it. The Sierra Leonean TRC, the CEDAW convention, the UN Beijing Platform 
for Action, and the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights continue to 
support quotas for women on party lists.604  
 In regards to the Sierra Leonean workforce, women comprise 51 percent of the 
labor force; however, women overwhelmingly work in the agricultural sector (71 percent) 
and less in the services sector (26 percent), and are almost non-existent in the country’s 
industrial sector (3 percent).605 While women continue to participate less in the formal 
economy of the country, they provide wages and resources for the household. Moreover, 
women and girls are overwhelmingly responsible for the collection of water and 
firewood; both essential for the survival of rural families.606 
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 In 2012, the World Bank estimated that one in 25 women in Sierra Leone die 
from either childbirth or complications relating to pregnancy.607 To this note, Sierra 
Leone has the sixth highest maternal mortality rate (970 out of 100,000 live births) in 
sub-Saharan Africa, following only behind Chad, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and 
Burundi.608 However, in attempts to reduce the country’s high maternal mortality rate, the 
Koroma administration issued free health care services in 2010 for mothers, pregnant 
women, children under five, and mothers who are nursing.609 These free services were 
established to help over 230,000 pregnant women and one million children.610 One 
criticism of the program remains the fact that these free health care services are not 
accessible for some women because they were unable to travel to the clinics, and that 
victims of sexual and domestic violence are not specifically covered, unless they are 
mothers or are pregnant.611 Such reforms to healthcare however, are needed; Sierra Leone 
is ranked by the World Bank as one of the worst places in the world for girls because of 
its high infant mortality rate, especially for girl babies.612  
 In regards to education, for women aged 25 years and older, fewer than 30 percent 
are literate, compared with 52 percent of men. Fewer than 46 percent of girls aged 15-24 
are literate, compared with 66 percent of boys the same age.613 For secondary school 
enrollment, 27 percent of boys attend school versus 19 percent of girls.614 While the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 The World Bank, “World Development Report 2012,” 15. 
608 WHO, “Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990-2008,” 17. 
609 Amnesty International, “Sierra Leone,” last modified 2011, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/sierra-
leone/report-2011#section-124-7. 
610 Ibid. 
611 International Rescue Committee, “Let Me Not Die Before My Time,” 21. 
612 The World Bank, “World Development Report 2012,” 119. 
613 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The World’s Women 2010,” 190. 
614 Ibid, 196. 
	  
130 
literacy rates both women and men are low, they have steadily increased since the 1970s, 
when rates were eight percent and 18 percent, respectively.615 
 It is evident from the information presented above that women in Sierra Leone 
continue to struggle, partly based on their gender. For example, the Sierra Leonean 
constitution, amended in 2001, recognizes customary law, even though some laws are 
discriminatory towards women and girls.616 However, in 2007, the government passed 
laws to prohibit domestic violence and forced marriage, and also granted women the right 
to own and inherit property.617 These laws were pushed for by various women’s groups 
within the country. Despite the mentioned changes to the law, traditional and societal 
discrimination continues to exist, as will be discussed below. 
 As in Liberia, rape continues to be a problem and the rapists are now more likely 
to include teachers and family members.618 This fact makes rape even harder to gauge 
and combat. Similar to the situation in Liberia, all community and societal sexual taboos 
were broken during the war in Sierra Leone. The act of rape was so widespread it was 
trivialized by assailants. Since the war, rape continues to be a pastime for some. In 2010, 
over 65 rapes were reported each day in the city of Makeni, and similar numbers are 
recorded in both the Kono and Kailahun districts.619 In an attempt to deal with the 
problem, on August 24, 2012, Sierra Leone’s House of Parliament passed the Sexual 
Offenses Act, which increases jail time for perpetrators of sexual violence and sets 
penalties for forced marriage, where before, there were no punishments for forced and/or 
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underage marriage.620 The law is not without opponents, however, with members of 
parliament claiming that the penalties are too harsh.621 This opposition reinforces the 
traditional idea that sexual violence and domestic violence is not serious crime but a 
private matter that should not go through formal courts. 
 To improve reporting rates, in 2003, the government created the Family Support 
Unit (FSU), with help of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
Sierra Leonean Police Force. The FSU attempts to combat sexual violence, rape, and 
domestic violence. Since the creation of the FSU, reports of abuse and rape have 
increased due to the fact that women and girls now have a greater access to report these 
crimes. This is remarkable in a country where rape has historically been seen has a 
societal “norm” rather than a criminal offense.622 As the U.S. Department of State details:  
During the year [2008] the FSU recorded 1,186 cases of sexual assault. In these 
cases, 437 perpetrators were charged, while 555 were still under investigation. 
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported that at least 25 cases resulted 
in convictions, with perpetrators receiving sentences between 18 months and 
seven years. Rape cases frequently were settled out of court or did not make it to 
trial because of inefficiencies in the judicial system.623 
 
Most recently, from January to June 2011, the FSU recorded 95 cases of sexual assault, 
down from 1,186 in 2008.624 As the U.S. Department of State explains, data for 
convictions was not known, but few perpetrators were even charged. In addition, very 
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few of the legal advisors in charge of these cases were qualified. For example, some 
advisors and prosecutors only had three weeks of training.625 As recently as February 
2011, however, special courts known as “Saturday Courts” were founded in in attempt to 
speed up the process and deal with backed up case logs.626 Regardless of this 
improvement, gathering evidence in regards to sexual abuse and violence remains 
difficult. According to a UN report, in the western area of the country there is only one 
doctor and only 12 doctors in the entire country who can provide exams documenting 
evidence of sexual abuse.627 For example, the Saturday Courts have increased the number 
of cases (more than 600) and have also decreased the time it takes to hear these cases; 
prior to the Saturday Courts, the trial process for sexual violence victims could take up to 
three years, but now can take only three weeks.628 
 In addition to the FSU and Saturday Courts, in 2007, the IRC combined with the 
Sierra Leonean government to create Sexual Assault Referral Centers (SARC) in the 
cities of Freetown, Kinema, and Kono. All services, including psychological support, 
counseling, medical exams, food, clothes, and legal support, are free. In these three 
centers alone, over 1,500 sexual assault survivors were helped between March 2003 and 
September 2005. In addition, clinics and doctors are reporting higher levels of rape and 
sexual violence against young girls and children. In 2011, the IRC reported that 26 
percent of its rape patients were under 11 years old, where some were as young as ten 
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months old.629 In 2006, the FSU reported that 65 percent of reported rape victims were 
under 18 years of age.630 
 The SARC reform however, is significant as analyst Amie-Tejan Kellah details, 
“Singled out by UNHCR in 2004 as one of seven ‘best practice’ GBV programmes 
worldwide, the SARC project has taken a multi-disciplinary approach to sexual assault. 
Since no single agency or organisation has the mandate or the capacity to address GBV 
alone, SARC has worked with a range of government and nongovernment 
stakeholders.”631 But because so many women and girls in Sierra Leone need assistance, 
it is difficult and nearly impossible to help everyone who needs it. 
 As mentioned earlier, in terms of domestic violence, in 2007 Sierra Leone passed 
the Domestic Violence Act, making it a criminal offense for the first time in the country’s 
history.632 During 2009, the FSU received 2,738 domestic violence reports. Out of these 
reports charges were filed in only 360 cases.633 In 2011, the FSU received 999 reports of 
domestic violence but charges were filed in only 133 cases, and there were seven 
convictions.634 While the number of reports declined, this does not necessarily mean a 
decline in rates of domestic violence. It is possible that because of the rarity of 
convictions in domestic violence cases, women no longer bother to report these crimes, 
because more than likely no charges will be filed. 
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 Another reason why few cases end in conviction is that many women in Sierra 
Leone are dependent upon their husbands for money, and because of their financial 
dependence, they may be less willing to press charges.635 But, more women are coming 
forward, possibly because of the Domestic Violence Act. It is mostly urban women who 
report rape and domestic violence. Rural women are far from police stations and because 
they are more vulnerable to familial pressures to not report, rural women are more likely 
to suffer in silence.636 Another reason some women choose not to come forward is 
because the police will not take her charge seriously, as seen in a testimony given to the 
IRC, “Some of the police, they can say, ‘It’s because of your ways that your husband beat 
you.’ Sometimes in your presence they will say, ‘Okay, I’m going to jail this man for 
beating you,’ then as soon as you leave, they’ll set him free. Sometimes the men bribe the 
police.”637 
 While Sierra Leone is one of the few countries in West Africa to criminalize 
domestic violence, the country has only 50 social workers, and the Ministry of Social 
Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs (the ministry that supervises the Domestic 
Violence Act) receives only 1 percent of the national budget.638 This figure is 
exceptionally low, but not unusual. The Ministry of Defense receives 18.2 percent of the 
national budget, while the Ministry of Education, Youths, and Sports receives only 14.6 
percent, and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation receives less than 7 percent of annual 
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budget.639 Again, while the 1 percent allocated to the Ministry of Social Welfare, this is 
an increase from 0.4 percent of the national budget in 2010.640  
 For these women and girls, the same problems that contributed to wartime rape 
are associated with the high levels of domestic and intimate partner violence. According 
to the IRC, domestic violence is the “…Most urgent, pervasive and significant protection 
issue for women in West Africa.”641 The IRC has called on the international community 
to draw attention to the problem and increase aid in order to help combat it.642 The 
problem, they point out, is that the international community is now willing to draw 
attention to wartime rape, but is reluctant to do the same for post-conflict domestic 
violence. They explain, “If the humanitarian community ignores what has been 
considered a ‘private matter’, it will fail to confront one of the most significant public 
health crises and primary obstacles to women's empowerment in post-war societies.”643 
Furthermore, as the IRC contends, domestic violence is not specific to only countries that 
have recently experienced war; it exists in virtually every country of the world; however, 
conflict makes violence more common and post-conflict situations make women even 
more vulnerable.644 Domestic violence in this context is described by the IRC as “…An 
acute and pervasive problem that endangers, isolates and disenfranchises countless 
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women and hinders recovery and development in their communities.”645 In 2011 for 
example, the IRC reported that 60 percent of the women receiving services, such as 
medical or psychological support, were at the IRC’s clinics because of domestic 
violence.646 In addition, 53 percent required medical attention and 70 percent had 
experienced violence by the same partner previously.647 It is apparent that the post-war 
period is marked by new manifestations of violence.  
 Yet, sexual violence and domestic violence are not problems just for women and 
girls, but for the entire country. As analysts Rashida Manjoo and Calleigh McRaith 
explain, sexual violence following conflict severely undermines the reconstruction 
processes of countries. In addition, sexual and domestic violence may become more 
widespread post conflict. According to Manjoo and McRaith, “The post-conflict rise in 
incidents of domestic violence, for example, has led to speculation of a relationship 
between these forms of [gender-based violence] GBV and the availability of small arms, 
an increased tolerance of violence within society, and the head of households having been 
engaged in military violence during the conflict.”648 Health workers within the country 
have said that levels of sexual violence post conflict have actually been higher than levels 
experienced during the conflict.649 These increased levels of sexual violence and GBV 
have been seen in the aftermath of war all over the world, including the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. 
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V. POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: 
ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION, AND LOOKING FORWARD 
 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, there is no easy explanation for the high 
levels of post-conflict sexual violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, we return to the 
research question: what factors are correlated with the continuation of widespread acts of 
rape even after the cessation of formal conflict, specifically in the cases of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone? I have hypothesized that governments in which there are higher levels of 
female leadership and representation will be associated with lower levels of impunity for 
sexual assault and this will result in lower levels of sexual violence. The thesis has tested 
the hypothesis and this chapter sums up its findings as to the relationship between the 
dependent variable (post-conflict sexual violence) and the independent variables 
(impunity and female representation in government) in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 To reiterate, the civil war in Liberia lasted from 1989-2003, beginning after 
Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) began a rebellion 
against the government of Samuel Doe. Over the course of the war close to half of the 
country’s population of 4.5 million was displaced and an estimated 300,000 Liberians of 
all ethnicities were killed, many more than in Sierra Leone.650 In addition, between 60 
and 70 percent of the female population, women and girls, were subjected to some form 
of sexual violence.651 The war in Sierra Leone, lasting from 1991 to 2002, was highly 
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interwoven with the war in Liberia. Charles Taylor and the NPFL supported the rebel 
movement led by Foday Sankoh, and his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was able to 
overthrow the Sierra Leonean government and subsequently gain control over large areas 
of the country, especially the country’s diamond mines.652 At least 50,000 Sierra 
Leoneans were killed over the course of the war, over 2.6 million people were displaced 
(similar to the number in Liberia) and an estimated 72 percent of women and girls 
endured some form of human rights abuse and 50 percent (an astonishing figure, but not 
as high as in Liberia) suffered some form of sexual violence.653 During the war in Liberia, 
women and girls of every ethnic group were targeted for acts of sexual violence and these 
acts have aided in the destruction of society.654 In Sierra Leone, Binaifer Nowrojee 
describes how “Indiscriminate killings, amputations, rapes, and abductions characterized 
Sierra Leone’s decade-long conflict. The crimes of sexual violence committed against 
thousands of women and girls were extraordinarily brutal and were often accompanied by 
other egregious abuses of the victim and her family.”655  
In terms of women and war, Africana analyst Filomina Chioma Steady details, 
“Women are among the most affected victims of war and are also vulnerable to sexual 
crimes. In addition, they are responsible for taking care of other victims of war. Although 
women undergo great trauma, they tend to show courage and tenacity and a desire to 
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move on.”656 After their respective wars ended, both Liberia and Sierra Leone entered a 
period of reconstruction and peace building, in the hopes that they could move on from 
the conflicts and not revisit them in the future. As we saw in the previous chapter, Liberia 
created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in an attempt to promote societal 
reconciliation and Sierra Leone created both a TRC and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), in conjunction with the United Nations.657 In terms of their respective 
commissions, both released reports stating that the wars had caused tremendous damage 
to civil society and their entire countries. Both detailed how all armed groups deliberately 
exploited civilians, especially women and children, and that neither rebel movement was 
ideological rather, they terrorized their populations simply to acquire economic and 
political power.  
Because of this deliberate exploitation of women and children, the Sierra Leonean 
TRC and the Liberian TRC focused on the experiences of women and children and 
suggested recommendations for the future. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are 
beneficial for truth telling, narratives, and explanations, but perhaps less beneficial in 
terms of dealing with impunity and prevention, as seen in the case of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. As described in Chapter 4, the Liberian TRC was able to record 163,615 
violations from 93,322 victims and in Sierra Leone, their TRC gathered far fewer 
testimonials of over 40,000 violations from more than 10,000 victims. These numbers are 
consistent with the number of Liberians versus Sierra Leoneans that reported human 
rights abuses and also those that were killed (300,000 in Liberia (one percent of the 
population) versus 50,000 in Sierra Leone (0.01 percent of the population)).  
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Both wars were associated with high levels of human rights abuses, especially 
sexual violence, and the levels of gender-based violence (GBV) have not been curbed 
simply because the wars are technically over. The question is: how do countries heal and 
move forward? Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder explain that advocates of the 
reconciliation approach propose a method that focuses on the survivors and victims of 
conflict, rather than reprisal for the perpetrators. Furthermore, they argue that this 
“cathartic truth telling” improves civil society as well as compensating victims 
psychologically.658 However, Liberia has embraced a reconciliation approach over a 
retributive approach but has not benefited from it. The specific reason for this is unclear; 
however, a lack of political will/public support (on the part of Liberians politicians and 
the international community) has been the standard reason for why one was not 
established.659 Ultimately, the Liberian political elite came down against establishing 
such a court, fearing that the retributive approach could destabilize the country and the 
region.660 
Sierra Leone, on the other hand, has had the opportunity to punish perpetrators 
through the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Some of those responsible for 
atrocities during the war have faced indictments and charges, although this is the 
exception rather than the rule. As stated in Chapter 4, the SCSL has only indicted 21 
individuals, the intellectual architects of the war, such as Charles Taylor and Issa Sesay. 
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The significance of these indictments are seen as strikes against impunity; however, the 
majority of rapists in Sierra Leone were never held accountable and never will be. 
Because for the war’s low level offenders, impunity is the norm, sexual violence persists. 
But the situation is even worse in Liberia. Without a sanctioned special court in Liberia, 
virtually no one was held accountable and post-war GBV continues unabated. 
Since the wars, the situation for women in Liberia and Sierra Leone is similar. 
Women continue to face a variety of problems besides GBV. They constitute half of the 
work force but are relegated to the least productive sectors, limiting their autonomy and 
salaries.661 Although they provide essential resources for their families and the informal 
sector, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, women comprise more than half of the country’s 
workforce, yet women make up 70 percent of the workers in the agricultural sector where 
wages are irregular, although they provide essential resources for their families.662 
Furthermore, in terms of health and education, women in both Liberia and Sierra Leone 
have some of the world’s lowest life expectancies and highest rates of maternal mortality. 
In addition, female literacy rates in both Liberia and Sierra Leone are low, in conjunction 
with girls’ low enrollment rates in primary and secondary school.   
In terms of gender equality post-conflict, women and girls in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone continue to be discriminated against, by both law and practice. Today, in many 
ways women in Liberia and Sierra Leone have second-class citizen status. However, it 
was not always this way. In the pre-colonial era, women in both countries played 
leadership roles. They even served as chiefs and paramount chiefs, but Steady details 
how colonialism wedged these women out of the political sphere. She states: 
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“Colonialism had a generally negative impact on indigenous female leadership and 
eliminate or demoted many women leaders.”663 Women are now just beginning to reenter 
these positions after the war.664 This is not to say that indigenous societies were 
matriarchies, or that female leaders were the rule; but it is important to note that their 
mistreatment during the war and their relatively low status over the last 50 years is not 
“traditional.” 
The most notable difference between Liberia and Sierra Leone today in terms of 
female leadership is that Liberia is led by a female executive, President Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf, who was elected in 2005 and again in 2011. President Sirleaf has championed 
herself as a feminist, and has appointed more women to leadership positions within her 
government than previous administrations. For example, President Sirleaf has appointed 
15 Deputy Ministers and 16 Assistant Ministers.665 Prior to her administration, in the six 
decades from 1948-2006 a total of only seven female Deputy Ministers were appointed to 
office.666 Today, however, women only comprise 30 percent of President Sirleaf’s 
cabinet.667   
In 2007, Ernest Bai Koroma was elected Sierra Leone’s president. No female 
candidate ran for president that year, and Koroma was most recently elected to a second 
term in November 2012, receiving more than 50 percent of the votes in an election that 
was viewed as free and fair by observers.668 As described in Chapter 4, Koroma is 
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considered a feminist. For example, he has championed women as “everything” and has 
stated that they must be valued in society.669 Since 2002, President Koroma has appointed 
five women to his cabinet (out of 29). In addition, the first female Chief Justice was 
appointed by President Koroma. Still, as of 2012, only 10 percent of President Koroma’s 
ministers were women (three out of 29). 
As of 2012, both Liberia and Sierra Leone had roughly the same percentage of 
female representation in their national governments. In Liberia, women comprise 12.5 
percent of the parliament, while in Sierra Leone women hold 14.5 percent of the seats. 
Both countries have seen increases in female representation; in 1997 women held fewer 
than six percent of parliamentary seats in Liberia and in 1995 in Sierra Leone women 
comprised 6.25 percent of the country’s members of parliament.670 While the 2012 
numbers amount to a doubling of female political representatives, it comes nowhere close 
to meeting Liberia’s unenforced 30 percent quota (aimed at ensuring women’s 
representation on political party lists). Although the Sierra Leonean TRC recommended it, 
the government has not adopted such a quota in the country. Even without the quota, 
however, women constitute a slightly higher percentage of the elected representatives in 
Sierra Leone than Liberia.671  
Getting more women into decision-making roles is one thing; changing law and 
society when it comes to GBV is another. As discussed in earlier chapters, in terms of 
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impunity and sexual violence that occurred during the war, the Sirleaf government has 
instituted a Gender Unit and a Gender Committee (based on the recommendations of the 
TRC), a gender-based National Plan of Action in 2005, Criminal Court E, and the 
Children’s Law of Liberia in 2012. On the other hand, in relation to legal initiatives, 
Sierra Leone has amended many customary laws which discriminate against women and 
girls, including the law that required rape victims to marry their rapists. Also, the Family 
Support Unit (FSU) was created to help combat domestic violence, sexual violence, and 
rape. The result is that the number of Sierra Leonean women who report their gender-
based crimes has increased. “Saturday Courts” were installed in 2011 to help speed up 
the 700 plus backed case logs.672 Sexual Assault Referral Centers (SARCs) were created, 
and are free of charge to all survivors. They provide services such as counseling, legal 
support services, and medical care.673  
On the other hand, the Sirleaf government has not instituted initiatives like this. 
The Liberian Ministry of Gender and Development only speaks of two achievements in 
its Annual Report in 2011 in terms of GBV since the end of the war (both involve the 
National Action Plan, which has been criticized as ineffective in preventing GBV).674 As 
the International Rescue Committee points out, while laws forbidding rape are on the 
books, and a special sex-crimes court, Criminal Court E, few perpetrators have been 
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convicted, showing that this government has not led when it comes to implementation of 
the law.675  
Out of 771 rape victims treated by Médecins Sans Frontières, only four were 
pursued in court.676 Furthermore, of the 903 reported rapes between April 2010 and 
March 2011, only 38 reached the trial phase and only 17 resulted in convictions.677 Sierra 
Leone has not performed much better in terms of prosecuting rapists. Few perpetrators 
are held accountable for sexual violence. For example, in the Sierra Leonean Family 
Support Unit, created in 2003, charges were filed in only 437 out of 1,186 sexual assault 
cases, and only 25 of those cases resulted in trials and convictions.678 Since their creation, 
these courts have heard over 600 cases, resulting in only 53 convictions.679 
As described in Chapter 4, other forms of GBV besides rape remain a problem in 
both Liberia and Sierra Leone. In both cases, domestic violence has continued and has 
become widespread. In 2007, Sierra Leone’s Domestic Violence Act banned domestic 
violence and forced marriage. As it currently stands, there is no legislation in Liberia that 
outlaws or bans domestic violence. The female-led government does not heavily fund 
domestic violence shelters. This may be due to the militarization of society during their 
respective conflicts. During the wars, societal taboos that protected females regarding 
sexual relations, rape, and gender were crushed in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Since 
the wars, military and rebel troops are no longer the perpetrators of GBV crimes, rather 
they are community members such as teachers and religious leaders. When the attackers 
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are family members, it becomes more difficult to bring forward sexual violence and 
domestic violence crimes because these crimes are seen as family matters and are 
silenced.680 
Post-conflict sexual violence levels as well as domestic violence levels remain 
high in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Statistics on domestic violence prior to the wars are 
virtually unknown due to stigma and shaming that accompanies such crimes, as well as a 
lack of reporting mechanisms. But since the Koroma administration in Sierra Leone, the 
government has created organizations in hopes of reducing this stigma and also 
encouraging women who have been victimized to come forward. The Saturday Courts 
have made a significant difference in women’s lives. Prior to the Koroma government’s 
establishment of these courts, there were long delays in terms of prosecution and many 
survivors dropped their cases.681 Such leadership distinguishes the Sierra Leonean 
government from Liberia’s. In Liberia, the gender-based National Plan of Action has not 
helped to combat the problem of sexual violence, nor has it increased convictions for 
those accused of sexual violence and rape.  
In hopes dealing more effectively with GBV, it is imperative that Liberia follows 
Sierra Leone’s lead and outlaws domestic violence. Both rape and domestic violence 
limit females’ ability to fully participate in society, especially given the stigma that 
surrounds both types of violence. How is it expected that Liberia will deal effectively 
with its rape and sexual violence problem, without actually outlawing the domestic 
violence problem? Until the government takes the lead in sending the message that it is 
wrong to sexually assault those closest to you, how will it persuade citizens to view such 
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acts as fundamentally wrong? This presents a larger societal problem regarding the role 
of women in society as well as their value within it. GBV of all kinds (including rape and 
domestic violence) is ultimately about women as property and controlling them. The long 
period of war has shredded traditional social fabrics in both countries. Where women 
were once revered as leaders and mothers they are now too often seen simply as objects. 
While a female was elected president in Liberia, it should not be assumed that gender 
relations have improved. Women’s parliamentary participation continues to be low and 
GBV levels continue to be high. 
For this study, I have hypothesized that governments in which there are higher 
levels of female leadership and representation will be associated with lower levels of 
impunity for sexual assault and this will result in lower levels of sexual violence. This 
thesis finds, however, that governments with higher levels of female leadership and 
political representation are not necessarily associated with lower levels of impunity for 
sexual assault and therefore are not necessarily associated with a reduced prevalence of 
sexual violence. Although sexual violence levels in Sierra Leone are currently not 
significantly lower than in Liberia, the (male-led) government has made more of an effort 
than the government led by a woman.682 But the key seems to be impunity; where 
perpetrators of violence are not held accountable, regardless of who is in power, GBV is 
likely to continue unabated. Therefore, there are at least two things to consider: 1) Has 
the government led efforts to combat GBV? 2) Have rates of GBV fallen? The answer for 
Sierra Leone is yes on the first question and no on the second. For Liberia, it appears to 
be no on both. If simply having a female-headed government made a difference, we 
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would see lower levels of post-conflict rape as well as domestic violence in Liberia. In 
addition, it may be as former Sierra Leonean presidential candidate Julius Maada Bio 
suggested: when it comes to gender, there is only so far people are willing to go, and only 
so much change they are up for. Ironically, it may be that a male-headed government 
might have more leeway to make gender reforms than a female-headed one. 
Therefore, this study finds that the initiatives of the kind promoted in Sierra 
Leone will affect women’s lives more positively than simply having a female head of 
state. The existence of a female head of state is not enough. While the election of Africa’s 
first female president, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is unique and a landmark for 
Africa and Liberian society as a whole, Steady states that “…Women still face obstacles 
based on gender-based discrimination that can lead to a retrograde step…the reality 
remains that women’s formal access to power is severely limited.”683 Citizens may elect a 
female executive, but the existence of a female president does not necessarily reflect (or 
translate into) changed gender relations. Much as in the United States, citizens of all races 
elected a Black president, but it is too early to celebrate the end of racism. Likewise, it is 
too early to applaud the end of gender discrimination in Liberia. It seems that simply 
having a female head of government does not necessarily translate into gender equality, 
let alone actively female-friendly or feminist policies.  
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CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The literature on women’s lives in Liberia and Sierra Leone focuses on their 
experiences during each country’s respective civil war. Prior to these conflicts, women’s 
experiences in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were often homogenized with those of their 
male counterparts, and thus women were invisible. Ten years into a post-conflict period, 
it is important to conduct research that not only differentiates women’s participation in 
society from men, but also focuses more heavily on the post-conflict experiences of 
women, specifically the sexual violence that follows after war. This perspective is 
important because sexual violence affects women’s ability to participate in all areas of 
life and therefore negatively affects the development (political and economic) of the 
country.  
In conjunction with this idea, it is imperative to focus on (women and men’s) 
political leadership roles post-conflict, and how these roles may affect the sexual violence 
that endures in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Because the findings from these case 
studies cannot be assumed to be true for countries around the world, it would be useful to 
use them in comparison with other post-conflict societies. As more women enter the 
political sphere in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, it will be interesting to see whether 
(because of their increased participation) women encounter backlash in the form of rising 
GBV or whether levels of GBV must fall before more women enter politics. Because of 
the findings of this study, there are new questions to be asked. For example, why is 
increasing female leadership not enough? What else needs to be done to reach gender 
equality? In this sense, implementation of already existing laws is increasingly important, 
and among one of the more practical steps these countries can take.  
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To conclude, it is imperative that governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone take 
steps to eradicate the GBV that plagues their societies and prevents them from moving 
forward. This will not happen until the issue of post-conflict GBV is addressed. 
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TABLE 1: 
 
PEACE AGREEMENTS: LIBERIA 
NAME DATE SIGNED 
Banjul III Agreement 24 October, 1990 
Bamako Ceasefire Agreement 28 November, 1990 
Banjul IV Agreement 21 December, 1990 
Lomé Agreement 13 February, 1991 
Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement 30 October, 1991 
Geneva Agreement 1992 07 April, 1992 
Cotonou Peace Agreement 25 July, 1993 
Akosombo Peace Agreement 12 September, 1994 
Accra Agreements/Akosombo 
Clarification Agreement 21 December, 1994 
Abuja Peace Agreement 19 August, 1995 
Abuja II Peace Agreement 17 August, 1996 
Accra Ceasefire Agreement 17 June, 2003 
Accra Peace Agreement 18 August, 2003 
 
  
	  
152 
TABLE 2: 
 
PEACE AGREEMENTS: SIERRA LEONE 
NAME DATE SIGNED 
Abidjan Peace Agreement 30 November, 1996 
Lomé Peace Agreement 7 July, 1999 
Abuja Ceasefire Agreement 10 November, 2000 
 
TABLE 3: 
 
WARRING FACTIONS: LIBERIA 
NAME REBEL/GOVERNMENT 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) Rebel 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) Government 
Liberia Peace Council (LPC) Rebel 
Lofa Defense Force (LDF) Rebel 
United Liberation Movement of Liberia 
for Democracy (ULIMO) Rebel 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) Rebel 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(MODEL) Rebel 
United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) International 
Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) International 
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TABLE 4: 
 
WARRING FACTIONS: SIERRA LEONE 
NAME REBEL/GOVERNMENT 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Rebel 
Sierra Leone Army (SLA) Government 
National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC) Rebel 
Executive Outcomes (EO) International 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) Rebel 
Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) International 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) International 
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TABLE 5: 
 
COUNTRY COMPARISON: LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE 
LIBERIA  SIERRA LEONE 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf Head of State Ernest Bai Koroma 
Presidential Republic Type of Government Constitutional Republic 
3,685,076 Total Population 5,245,695 
1989-2003 Civil War 1991-2002 
300,000 Casualties 50,000 
Yes684 Wartime Sexual Violence Yes685 
Yes Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
Yes 
No Special Court Yes 
Yes686 Post-Conflict Sexual 
Violence 
Yes687 
12.5 percent Female Members of 
Parliament (as of 2012) 
14.5 percent 
6 Female Ministers (as of 
2012) 
3 
15 Female Deputy Ministers 
(as of 2012) 
3 
Yes (30 percent) Quota for Female 
Representation 
No 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
684 Absolute numbers for wartime sexual violence are not known, however, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) reported that 168,000 out of 500,000 displaced women were raped during the war. 
685 As stated above, exact numbers are not known. However, for example, Physicians for Human Rights 
estimated that 215,000-257,000 women and girls were raped over the course of the war. 
686 Absolute numbers are not known, however examples can be provided. For example, the Liberian 
government received reports of 164 cases of gender-based violence from October-December 2006. 
687 For example, in 2008, the Family Support Unit (FSU) reported 1,186 cases of sexual assault. 
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TABLE 6: 
 
POST-CONFLICT SEXUAL VIOLENCE INITIATIVES: LIBERIA AND SIERRA 
LEONE 
LIBERIA  SIERRA LEONE 
National Plan of Action 
(2005)  
Family Support Unit (FSU) 
(2003) 
Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Gender Unit 
(2006) 
 Domestic Violence Act (2007) 
Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Gender 
Committee (2006) 
 
Reversed the law that 
required rape victims to 
marry their rapists (2007) 
Rape Law (2006)  Sexual Assault Referral Centers (SARCs) (2007)  
Instituted age of consent 
(2007)  
Banned forced marriage 
(2007) 
Criminal Court E (2009)  “Saturday Courts” (2011) 
  Sexual Offenses Act (2012) 
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS 
 
After the war in Sierra Leone ended, international organizations increased their 
urgency in bringing attention to the problem of blood diamonds and stopping their sale. 
The government of Sierra Leone, USAID/OTI, the Diamond High Council (HRD) of 
Belgium, among others, created a certificate program to control “conflict” diamonds by 
providing a Certificate of Origin. The UN Security Council officially approved the Sierra 
Leone diamond certification program in August 2000.688  
 In December 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/56, 
supporting the creation of a global diamond certification program and in November 2002, 
the Kimberley Process was established, putting forth four points agreed upon by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, De Beers, Belgium, and African 
diamond producers.689 The four points included the establishment of a global diamond 
certificate system, a code of conduct, an agency to monitor the execution of the certificate 
system and code of conduct, and an expert group to recommend how best to apply the 
agreement.690 After these points were agreed upon, the Kimberley Process entered into 
force in January 2003. As of December 2009, the Kimberley Process had 49 members 
from 75 countries where these members account for 99.8 percent of the world’s diamond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 Ibid, 2. 
689 Ndumbe, “Diamonds, Ethnicity, and Power,” 102. 
690 Ibid, 102. 
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market.691 By all accounts, the Kimberley Process provides a working mechanism 
helping to end the illegal diamond trade. While the Kimberley Process is not an 
international treaty, any violation of the process can result in removal of the member. 
Because members make up nearly all of the world diamond market, the removal from the 
process can be detrimental.  
 There is some general disagreement as to the efficiency of the process. Critics 
such as Global Witness have released reports stating that illegal diamond mining 
continues in parts of Africa and that human rights abuses have occurred because of it.692 
On the other hand, some, such as Ernest Blom of the World Federation of Diamond 
Bourses, argue that the process has stopped wars from being funded by illegal diamond 
mining.693 As of 2012, conflict diamonds make up less than one percent of all traded 
diamonds whereas in the 1990s, it is estimated that conflict diamonds accounted for 
fifteen percent of the international diamond trade.694 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 “Background,” http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_en.html. 
692 “Diamonds: Does the Kimberley Process Work?, last modified June 28, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10307046. 
693 Ibid. 
694 “Background,” http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_en.html. 
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